Campaigning
## The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

Featured Essays

Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: Tenets to Guide the Integration of Women into Joint Combat Positions

The Russian Use of Media as an Influence System

Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity to Assess and Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations: A Case Study on ISIS

The Role of Innovation Cells in Department of Defense Innovation

"That All May Labor As One"

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In this issue of Campaigning:

Editor's Corner

Welcome to the 2017 Spring edition of *Campaigning*. This edition's Features section presents four JCWS student essays that discuss timely, relevant topics that affect the Joint force. The first featured essay, "Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: Tenets to Guide the Integration of Women into Joint Combat Positions," by Major Meridee Trimble, Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge Browne, Lieutenant Commander Daniel McClure, and Major Kenrick Forrester, suggests integrating women into combat arms and special operations roles will draw on the lessons learned from the integration of African Americans and openly homosexual personnel into the all-volunteer force. The successful integration of women into these new roles depends upon three imperatives: standards, leadership, and messaging.

The second featured essay, "The Russian Use of Media as an Influence System," by Major Robert Farrell, argues that the problem of a Russian state-sponsored media did not end with the demise of the Soviet Union. Rather, the current Russian formal and informal media systems purposefully promote conspiracy theories and other propaganda to subvert democratic stability and foment violence. Major Farrell provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian media system and concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

In our third featured essay, the authors assess ISIS through the lens of the Clausewitzian Trinity. In their essay, "Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity to Assess and Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations: A Case Study on ISIS,"

Captain Michael Baze, Colonel Lisa Whittaker, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Searcy and Commander Frankie Clark advocate by applying the principles of the Clausewitzian model, the U.S. would develop a better understanding of organizations and groups such as ISIS.

"The Role of Innovation Cells in DoD Innovation," by Commander James Darkenwald, Lieutenant Commander Christopher Casne, and Major Trevor Voelkel is our fourth featured essay. In this essay, the authors' state as the DoD faces a growing set of innovative adversaries, the ability of the U.S. to provide the necessary defenses are handicapped by budgetary constraints, large bureaucracies, and cumbersome acquisition processes. To counter this disadvantage, the authors propose aggressively developing and supporting 'game-changing' innovation cells within the Department of Defense.

In our Commentary section, Lieutenant Colonel John Bauer, PhD, provides an in-depth discussion of the virtue of truth in his essay, "Truthfulness, Trust, and the Practice of Military Deception." LTC Bauer submits the idea of military deception and truthfulness can and should be reconciled in a systematic and principled way.

Our final commentary is from Associate Professor Tom Snukis entitled, "Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace Through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding the Relevant Literature." In this essay, Snukis examines relevant research material on the subject and

highlights areas that U.S. policymakers, diplomats, Joint warfighters, and other governmental agencies must account for as they seek to understand emerging post-intervention environments.

This edition's Foresight Factor analyzes North Korea from a system's perspective and assesses the current U.S. policy's effectiveness. Major Tyler Standish and Lieutenant Colonel Ed Cuevas apply strategic foresight tools, such as historical time-lining, force field analysis, futures wheels, implications trees, as well as other

tools in the assessment of the policy. As a result of this analysis, Standish and Cuevas provide policy recommendations.

We hope you enjoy this edition of *Campaigning*. You can let me know what you think by emailing me at mccauleyd@ndu.edu.

Daniel H. McCauley
Editor

Maintaining the Warrior Ethos: Tenets to Guide the Integration of Women into Joint Combat Positions

by

Maj Meridee J. Trimble, LTC Eldridge D. Browne, LCDR Daniel S. McClure, and MAJ Kenrick D. Forrester

Introduction

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced the complete integration of women into direct ground combat positions beginning on January 1, 2016.[1] The joint force must be prepared to answer critical questions about this integration process. Is there a military necessity now or ever to integrate women into these positions? Will combat effectiveness be sacrificed for the advancement of diversity and social justice? Will the cost of integration, in terms of time, money, and equal representation, be worth the effort if the results yield substantially low numbers of women in these positions? Time will reveal the answers to these questions; however, the joint force's approach will have an unequivocal effect on the outcome of the integration process. Regardless of one's position about integration, the process has begun--what is important is not why it is being implemented, but how it will be implemented. Similar to racial desegregation and the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT), the joint force can successfully make the change, provided the plan and process incorporate the critical imperatives learned from previous implementation plans.

All military occupations and specialties, without exception, are now available to women meeting the qualifications and standards of the 220,000 previously restricted positions.[2] Gender integration and combat effectiveness studies informed the decision to open armor, infantry, reconnaissance, and special operations positions to qualified female participants. There were two key purposes behind the decision to integrate women into direct ground combat positions. The first was to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) fully acquired and applied the talents and skills of every service member to critical jobs across the organization. The second was to ensure the equal opportunity standard was applied throughout the organization regardless of race, sexual orientation, or gender.[3]

There have been divergent opinions regarding the numerous studies conducted in favor or against the integration of women into combat positions. Opponents cited studies that concluded combat effectiveness and unit morale would be negatively impacted by the integration of women into traditionally all-male combat units. These conclusions were supported by studies that highlighted the statistically significant success of all-male teams over gender-integrated teams in numerous infantry-related tasks.[4] Ultimately, the debate will continue among members in Congress and the U.S. population about why women should or should not be integrated. What is not in debate is the mission as a joint force. The Secretary of Defense determined it is in the best interest of the joint force to integrate women into combat positions to better manage talent and create more equal

opportunities. Therefore, it is critical to establish an implementation plan and a process ensuring the integrity of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion.

The integration programs to desegregate the armed forces, in 1948, and to repeal DADT, in 2011, provide critical insight about the imperatives required for success. These two historical integration programs exemplify how social dynamics in the military influenced the broader social environment, in the case of desegregation, and vice versa, with the repeal of DADT. The critical imperatives throughout these historical vignettes exemplify the importance of leadership; the enforcement of standards; and messaging to soldiers, leaders, and the U.S. population. The application of these imperatives, coupled with a strong understanding of group dynamics, will assist policymakers and unit leadership to manage organizational change during the transition to gender-integrated direct ground combat units.

The Key Tenets of Membership

The military services reflect the broader American demographic composition of diverse sub-cultures and groups sharing like values, identities, customs, and traditions. Within these groups, two key tenets contribute to the long-term survival of group norms and cohesion. Group norms establish essential rules for the behavior of members and leaders within the group.[5] Often informal, norms form the structure of the roles, interaction, and goals of the group. The second key tenet of any group is cohesion.

Cohesion is the key tenet that attracts members to the group and provides members solidarity and morale to achieve group goals.[6] Norms provide the structure of every group, but cohesion holds the group together.

Combat arms and special operations units comprise an esteemed group of service members, including Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen, Navy SEALs, Marine Corps Infantrymen, and Army Rangers. The identity of these groups is defined as "warriors among warriors." The group norms of these elite teams ascribe to an achievement of higher standards, a more aggressive nature, and a sharpened warrior ethos above all other service groups. The cohesion that holds members together can be defined in two primary categories: task and social cohesion.[7]

Task cohesion is defined as the technical capabilities required to accomplish group activities or a mission. Task cohesion is the shared commitment among members to achieve a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group.[8] This type of cohesion often translates into the combat effectiveness of a unit. Social cohesion is defined by the social-oriented factors that unify and bond members in pursuit of goals. This type of cohesion directly equates to unit morale. Social cohesion is the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend social time together, enjoy each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another.[9]

To successfully integrate women into combat arms and special operations units, service

members and the public must have a clear understanding of the expectations a group's membership entails. Unit membership is driven by group norms, and acceptance by the group is based on the new member's ability to conform to the critical factors that support cohesion. The challenge is having these types of units accept new members, specifically women, without unit members, supporters in Congress, and the public questioning the viability of unit survival based on the organizational change dynamic. If integration fails to observe the two aspects of cohesion, the result will be detrimental to new members and the unit. Opponents will inaccurately claim the failure as proof that women cannot achieve the same standards as men, rather than recognize it as a systematic failure of implementation.

Desegregation of the U.S. Military

Racial desegregation offers a perspective about how task cohesion and social cohesion were initially obstacles to integrating the armed forces, but eventually served as the reasons integration succeeded. Racial desegregation of the armed forces was propelled by social pressure, manpower shortfalls, and high casualty conflicts during World War II and the Korean War. Similarly, changing social, cultural, and organizational dynamics brought about the decision to integrate women into combat arms units. Initiatives to integrate the armed forces during conflict eras provide insight into some of the challenges faced during an extensive organizational overhaul. The DoD's racial bias centered around what leadership believed African Americans could

accomplish, describing task cohesion, and how African Americans could fit into the organization, describing social cohesion.

The biases that African Americans faced in the broader U.S. social context were mirrored in the early era of integrating the armed forces. Racism, segregation, and treatment as second-class citizens limited the professions in which African Americans were allowed to serve, and quotas restricted the number of African American service members to 10%.[10] Opponents argued that integrated units would degrade task cohesion, unit morale, and effectiveness and senior leaders' misperceptions about African Americans included lack of discipline and inferiority. Consequently, African American units struggled to gain the same opportunities afforded to Caucasian units, which would have allowed soldiers to demonstrate competence in the complex and high-stress environment of combat. Misperceptions about the capacity to function in combined arms units or hold positions of leadership over Caucasians relegated African Americans to manual and service-oriented positions, particularly as food preparation and transportation specialists in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army.[11]

The momentum to integrate was propelled, prior to and during WWII, by the African American community fighting for the right to serve and by challenging the status quo. African American soldiers sought social cohesion and identified as Americans fighting an oppressor.[12] Among recommendations made to the Secretary of War in 1941, were that African Americans be

trained in the same locations as Caucasians to facilitate efficiency, cut costs, and to improve training and throughput of Army Air Corps pilots and ground crews.[13] Additionally, a statement discussing the intolerance of discrimination was recommended, emphasizing the message be communicated to commanders in the field.[14]

World War II marked the initial integration of African Americans into the military's social fabric. Select Caucasian officers advocated for change because of African Americans' demonstration of task cohesion on the battlefield and the ability to overcome racial challenges while defending the nation.[15] Some Caucasian officers' positive experiences commanding African American troops during WWII bolstered the push toward integration. One such experience was expressed by the commander of the 600th Field Artillery Battalion, comprising all African American officers and soldiers, at the conclusion of the Italian Campaign in 1945. The commander stated, "I believe that the young Negro officer represents the best we have to offer, and under proper, sympathetic, and capable leadership, would have developed and performed equally with any other racial group….They were Americans before all else."[16]

African American Marines fighting in the Pacific theater battles, at Peleliu and Okinawa, demonstrated that race was not a factor in determining how service members perform. The strong task cohesion exhibited by African American soldiers at each opportunity countered the negative perceptions by opponents of desegregation.[17]

Despite such achievements during World War II, racism was the reason none of the 433 Medals of Honor (MoH) from this conflict were awarded to African Americans. Although some commanders nominated African Americans, it was not until 1996 that seven among those MoH nominees were awarded for actions during the war.[18]

On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces, mandating the "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed forces without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin."[19] This order included a provision that allowed for a gradual desegregation of the services to preclude a negative impact on morale or standards. Consequently, desegregation took nearly five years for the change to be implemented across the services because of institutional and social biases. An advisory committee was established to examine the rules, practices, and procedures of the armed services and recommend ways to implement the order.[20] Despite considerable resistance to the executive order from the military, it served as an impetus to change social norms and the services were nearly integrated by the end of the Korean War.[21]

Desegregation of the armed forces required considerable external pressure to force change in the military because social norms created friction and hampered integration. The Navy and Air Force integrated early in the process; however, the Army and Marine Corps resisted change.[22] The slow progress of the Army's desegregation prompted a letter from the American Veterans

Committee admonishing the service for taking over three years to implement Executive Order 9981.[23] The Army took an additional three years from the issuance of the order to integrate, as noted by a 1952 memo from the Commander of the European Command to subordinate Army units, directing full integration.[24]

Concurrently in the Far East Command, personnel shortages during the Korean War forced the Army to change. Units in Korea performed well because they operated cohesively, which diffused racial tensions. To build social cohesion in a diverse culture, two or more opposing elements must unite in a shared endeavor, experience the same shared hardships, and build trust in order to identify shared interests.[25] A relevant example of social cohesion was when the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps witnessed integrated units in combat operations and subsequently issued a study to determine the efficacy of integration.[26] As a result, the Commandant "announced a general policy of racial integration on 13 December 1951, thus abolishing the system first introduced in 1942 of designating certain units in the regular forces and organized reserves as Black units."[27] The entire military was desegregated by 1953; however, it took many years for racial tensions to subside. African Americans continued to suffer the impact of discrimination with lower performance ratings than Caucasians and earned limited placement in senior positions.[28]

There are several implications from racial desegregation that are applicable to the integration of women into combat units. First, the process to overcome bias will take time and will not occur quickly. Conflict as a catalyst for change, specifically, WWII and the Korean War, served as examples of how units contended with racial bias. Overcoming bias, in the context of gender, will be similarly contended with as women integrate into all combat positions. Second, change must be driven by senior leaders and be effectively communicated down to the combat arms and special operations units. Commanders must address the current institutional and cultural biases and shape the environment to change norms. One programmatic difference between racial integration and women in combat, which may assist to overcome bias, is that quotas will not be used. The quota systems used during World War II and the Korean War were not successful and actually hindered progress, allowing biases to persist. Performance-based standards are the metric that will ensure task cohesion; strong leadership will set the tone to ensure social cohesion.

Twenty-first century conflicts have opened the door for a change in the social norms of direct ground combat units. Women will likely face similar institutional and social biases and endure challenges similar to what African Americans experienced. Women will have to demonstrate success using the same standards as male counterparts. As the achievement of task cohesion occurs, social cohesion will develop, and women will be accepted as part of the group. Among the hurdles initial candidates may encounter are lower performance reports, slower career progression, and a struggle for the same

growth opportunities afforded to male counterparts. Women will have to prove themselves worthy of being considered part of the group by maintaining high standards and achieving task cohesion to gain acceptance, and ultimately, achieve social cohesion. Integration will be a slow process and shortcuts will derail and dilute the accomplishments of those women who are able to break into the group and achieve social cohesion.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

The DoD's 1981 policy of DADT continued the ban on homosexuals in the military, with the justification that "homosexuality is incompatible with military service."[29] One of President Clinton's campaign promises included supporting the service of openly homosexual personnel in the armed forces. The DoD was directed to research ways to ensure personnel could neither be questioned about sexual orientation, nor declare homosexuality. In the interim, the threat of discharge remained common for personnel openly declaring homosexuality or by marrying or attempting to marry an individual of the same sex.[30] Several Congressional efforts to repeal DADT were unsuccessful from 2005 to 2009 when acts were introduced to replace current laws with updated language eliminating discriminatory language based on sexual orientation.

President Obama's 2010 State of the Union Address revealed the intent to work with Congress and the DoD to repeal DADT.[31] A DoD working group was established to discuss how the military would incorporate

openly homosexual personnel if the DADT policy were repealed. Concurrently, think tanks researched whether or not the repeal of DADT would positively or negatively impact the services. Concerns included what aspects of the repeal would be addressed, how the effects would be measured, and in what ways unit cohesion would be impacted, if at all. Think tanks determined personal bias was estimated to have less sway over dedication to achieving the mission, indicating that sexual orientation did not influence group cohesion; however, mission accomplishment could be at risk.[32] Arguments against the repeal described a potentially pejorative impact on unit performance and social cohesion.[33] A 2009 letter to Congress, signed by 1,167 retired Flag and General Officers, expressed "unequivocal support for current law and opposition to any action to repeal or weaken it," citing "adverse effects for recruitment, retention, and overall readiness that eventually would break the all-volunteer force."[34] Such claims resonated as markedly similar to the arguments against the integration of African Americans into the armed forces.

The DoD working group recommended that for the DADT repeal to be implemented successfully, strong leadership, a clear message, and proactive training and education were key imperatives.[35] A support plan for implementation was released with a message that emphasized a Leadership-Professionalism-Trust paradigm.[36] The plan detailed a three-tiered education and training framework: Tier 1 (Expert Level); Tier 2 (Leader Level); and Tier 3 (Service Member Level).[37] Each service branch was directed to

conduct and document the training of all personnel. Tier 1 training was provided to experts who were predicted to deal with DADT repeal issues, including chaplains and judge advocates. Tier 2 training was provided to command leadership personnel and focused on the foundations of leadership, professionalism, discipline, and respect. It emphasized that command leadership must set the conditions for success of the DADT repeal training and implementation plan, including building unit cohesion, while maintaining readiness. Finally, Tier 3 training provided education for all service members about policies and standards of conduct.

The working group concluded that repealing DADT "would impose minimal risk to military readiness in terms of unit cohesion, recruitment, retention, and performance."[38] The Senate and House of Representatives repealed DADT and President Obama signed the law on December 22, 2010.[39] On July 22, 2011, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff certified implementation of the DADT repeal, which went into effect on September 20, 2011. Conclusions of an assessment one year after the repeal indicated "no negative impact on overall military readiness or its component parts: unit cohesion, recruitment, retention, assaults, harassment, or morale."[40] It must be considered that the DADT repeal likely caused an increase in honesty among service members, which resulted in improved trust and ability to work together effectively.[41] In an environment where people can be honest with one another, it allows to deeper bonds of trust to develop and increases social

cohesion.[42] The dire consequences envisioned by opponents of the DADT repeal paralleled arguments made against racial integration. Both were overcome by careful and thoughtful leadership and education.

Developing a key messaging strategy was one important lesson learned from the implementation of the DADT repeal, which can be applied to the formal integration of women into direct ground combat positions. The Leadership-Professionalism-Trust paradigm was paramount to the success of the DADT repeal. It committed leaders and subordinates to obey and comply with standards of conduct and highlighted that each and every member of the force must treat one another with respect.[43] Organizational change begins with leadership buy-in and is implemented with education and training. As learned during racial integration and the DADT repeal, the creation and maintenance of standards, as applied to task requirements, builds social cohesion. Furthermore, the social context aligned with the timing of guidance from civilian leadership and served as the impetus to repeal DADT.

The Approach for Gender Integration

A critical realization of complete gender integration is that the implementation program, to open all direct ground combat positions to women, constitutes the final step in a long-standing acceptance of women in the military. Policies expanding the integration of women into combat roles have endured decades and reflect the dynamics of social change. The transition to an all-

volunteer force, recruiting and retention conditions, and the evolving definition of combat, combat missions, and direct ground combat broadened women's integration into previously restricted roles.[44] The DoD's 1994 policy barred women from participating in units below the brigade level in which ground combat was the primary mission, namely armor, artillery, infantry, combat engineering, and battalion or smaller special operations units.[45]

Former Secretary of Defense Panetta released a directive in 2013 to explore implementation policies and plans, which resulted in studies about unit cohesion; equipment, gear, and uniform modifications; facility and infrastructure modifications; the propensity to serve in combat roles; and international issues.[46] After careful analysis drawn from the conclusions of 41 military department studies, Secretary Carter ordered all combat positions be opened to women. This section highlights three imperatives that emerged from the literature about how gender integration could occur successfully: 1) enforcement of standards, 2) leadership's management of cultural change, and 3) leadership's messaging and promotion of group norms and social cohesion.

The first imperative to successful implementation is the enforcement of standards. An abundance of studies have been conducted to determine if women should be excluded based on physical and physiological factors. Most concluded that women are capable of executing these tasks; however, the size of the female population that can execute these extraordinarily physically and psychologically demanding tasks is small.[47] When considering the current assessment and selection standards for special operations units, it was determined that the standards were valid for determining candidates' success in training and in the operational environment.[48] Consequently, most women cannot achieve the minimum standards; however, most men are also incapable of achieving the same standards. High standards are what create the elite force and are factors in developing group cohesion.[49]

Another aspect of enforcing standards is the avoidance of injuries. To be successful in combat arms and special operations units, women in these specialties must physically rank among the top 15% of all service women.[50] Several studies concluded that the women who perform at this level have been successful in the pilot programs. One advantage to creating gender-neutral standards is that most direct ground combat specialties did not previously require entrance assessments. Males were able to volunteer directly into these fields based on gender, similar to previous segregation policies that placed Caucasians in positions of superiority, despite any entry-level qualification standards. Consequently, this resulted in a segment of the male population suffering injuries, which limited success rates. The new gender-neutral standards help screen male and female applicants to ensure future success and to enhance group cohesion.[51] The key to implementation is reinforcing standards and ensuring service members adhere to the standards within these groups.

The second imperative to successful implementation is the role of leadership during the implementation process. Leadership is critical to preventing bias and effectively managing change. Unit commanders are responsible for managing this cultural shift within their formations. First, commanders will have to communicate that tasks and jobs must be assigned by meritocracy and ability, not by gender. Second, as learned from racial integration, the use of quotas would be contradictory to the application of standards; gender-neutral standards will likely result in unequal participation among men and women. Third, physical and other differences between the genders will be accounted for during implementation.[52]

Leadership will be required to not only prevent bias, but also to establish positive norms within the group that support social cohesion. An example of how understanding group norms contributes to success was highlighted in a multi-year study conducted by Google, an industry leader in leveraging group dynamics. A key conclusion was that the best way to build a perfect team is to create norms that regulate how members treat one another. The Google study offered two useful findings to empower leaders managing change in a group's culture. First, a group's collective intelligence can be raised with the right norms.[53] Second, teams are optimized by understanding and influencing group norms.[54] Military leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of joint teams will set the tone by managing the positive and negative factors affecting group norms and unit cohesion.

The third imperative is the aspect of messaging from the leader to the group members and to the external environment of the group. The successful integration of women into combat positions hinges on the reinforcement of positive group norms and unit cohesion elements. Social cohesion is predicated on the group sharing certain values, beliefs, and identities. All of these factors coalesce to build a perception about how the group interacts with one another and with other groups. Formal and informal communication inside and outside of the group is critical to the group's identity. An essential message to group members is that candidates who desire to join the group understand the group norms and must want to be a part of the group. The standards required to enter into combat positions will ensure that only those candidates who possess the ambition and motivation will endure the hardship required to enter into these types of positions. Messaging will reassure members that the unit's fundamental identity has not changed.

Another critical aspect of the message is understanding the audience and having the right messenger deliver the message. Physical standards have to be developed and universally implemented across the force at the highest level, but the message has to be tailored to the lowest level. Leaders at the lowest level have established credibility and a higher level of influence over subordinates.[55] The leaders within the units understand the specific dynamics of the

group based on the local environment. These leaders can deliver the message with great credibility that resonates with group members. Implementation will only work if the lowest level leaders are empowered to influence and motivate group members to conform based on their established credibility.

Conclusion

The lessons learned from integrating African Americans and openly homosexual personnel, into the all-voluntary military force, are that the equal opportunity to serve did not affect combat effectiveness or unit cohesion. These groups were accepted because members achieved the standards and ascribed to the norms within units. Minority groups ultimately have a lower representation within these types of units, not because of restrictions, but because most individuals comprising these groups do not socially want or need to conform to these types of units.[56] Additionally, leadership helps to shape group norms. Leadership highlights the professionalism, high esteem, esprit de corps, and mission success required to remain in these types of units. The integration of women into combat arms and special operations units will yield low numbers, but those who meet the physical and task standards will be successful.

The successful implementation of women into direct ground combat positions will be incumbent upon three imperatives: standards, leadership, and messaging. Standards should not cause concern because the shift to gender-neutral standards will offer the equal opportunity to apply. Should a member meet or exceed the physical standards, task cohesion will be achieved. Should a member psychologically identify with the group characteristic, social cohesion will be achieved. Leadership is crucial to the group's continued success by ensuring the right members are present in the unit, regardless of race, or sexual orientation, or gender. Messaging is an important part of the socialization process because leadership will be responsible for reminding current members that new members are applying, passing, and joining because of the desire to be a part of an elite unit. Additionally, as new members arrive to units, messaging should continue with the gender-integrated group to build and strengthen group cohesion.

The dimension of time is an important aspect to the three imperatives, as each needs to be addressed now and at the beginning of the implementation process, to ensure current members adjust to the impending change in group dynamics. It has taken decades to reach this level of integration and the remaining steps to completion will more than likely take years. The acceptance of women into direct ground combat positions can only be achieved by the artful way in which commanders apply leadership and messaging to the implementation process, while enforcing the standards. Successful significant cultural shifts are not made overnight but are gradually changed over time.

Author Biographies.

Major Meridee Trimble, PhD, USAF. Maj Trimble is a Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer, currently stationed at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea. She recently completed a Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer assignment at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in Arlington, VA. Maj Trimble earned a BA in Asian Studies from Thomas Edison State College, a MA in Management and Human Resources Development from Webster University, a MA in International Relations from St. Mary's University, a MA in National Security Affairs (Far East) from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a PhD in Educational Management (Higher Education) from Hampton University.

Lieutenant Colonel Eldridge Browne, USA. LTC Browne is currently serving in the Army G8 as a Force Development Planner. He recently completed a joint tour as a ground planner for United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea UCJ35 Future Plans. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer in the Army and earned a BS in Psychology from the University of Southern Illinois at Edwardsville in 1997, a MA in Management from Webster University in 2009, and a MS in Operational Art from the School of Advanced Military Science (SAMS) in 2010. Prior to his last assignment, he

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Lieutenant Commander Daniel McClure, USN. LCDR McClure is currently serving as Chief Medical Plans, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Fort Eustis, VA. He was commissioned through Medical Enlisted Commissioning Program in 2001. LCDR McClure earned a BS in Nursing from the University of Maine, Fort Kent, in 2001, a MBA from TUI University in 2006, and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College in 2013. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the Department Head Surgical Services onboard USNS COMFORT.

Major Kenrick Forrester, USA. MAJ Forrester is currently serving in the Joint Staff J37 as an action officer. He was commissioned through Officer Candidate School as an Infantry Officer and then selected as a Special Forces Officer. He earned a BA in Business Administration from Upper Iowa University in 1999, a MA in Political Science from Kansas State in 2004, and a MMS in Military Studies from Marine Corps University in 2013. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the 7th Special Forces Group Executive Officer.

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The Russian Use of Media as an Influence System

By

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For much of its history, the Russian government has been known to engage in media manipulation and control. During the Cold War, the United States took a relatively active approach to countering these efforts with a structure and policy centered on the United States Information Agency (USIA). However, much of USIA was dismantled or subsumed into the Department of State in 1999. This, no doubt, seemed reasonable at the time given the euphoria of the breakup of the Soviet regime, but today there is a growing realization that the problem of a Russian State-sponsored media did not actually end with the demise of the Soviet Union.

Russian use of media to support their incursion into Crimea was clear. It was, in fact, openly acknowledged by high profile member of the Russian Parliament, Nikolai Valuyev, who wrote on Twitter, "This is an information war. We flew into this heroic city of Sevastopol to personally support residents and learn the situation on the inside."[1] In addition to supporting the annexation of part of the Ukraine, there is ample evidence that the Russia media apparatus is promoting conspiracy theories, throwing fuel onto U.S. police brutality and racial fires, alleging U.S. government misconduct,[2] and most egregiously, actively interfering with the U.S. election process.[3] Meanwhile, there is little evidence that U.S. information policy has changed to address these issues although there

have been calls for action from senior members of Congress. Notably, Congressman Ed Royce, chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee stated during a hearing that "Russia's propaganda machine is in overdrive, working to subvert democratic stability and foment violence."[4] Clearly, this is an area that requires examination. To that end, I will use a variety of strategic foresight and systems thinking tools to scrutinize Russian media. This analysis begins with an internal look at the Russian system then progresses to look at trends, implications, and potential future scenarios before assessing current U.S. policy with regards to Russian media, and, finally, recommending changes.

This project will attempt to model the media system used by the Russian government in their attempts to exert influence in the interests of the State. By necessity, it will represent something of a simplification. Russia is not well-known for being particularly forthcoming in this area, so good information is fairly scant; especially when limiting the search to open source. The following Casual Loop Diagram (CLD) is based largely upon John A. Dunn's "Lottizzazione Russian Style: Russia's Two-tier Media System,"[5] and is supplemented by prior research conducted on the subjects of Russia's concept of "maskirovka", their central national narratives, and their "Troll Army." A diagram such as this is a useful way to visualize a system, and graphically examine relationships and the flow of interactions within it. In the case of Russian media, it allows us to take an enormously

Figure 1.

complex system and represent it in a way that fosters discussion and understanding.

This graphical representation of the system reveals a pattern which may be surprising for one who expects a largely State-sponsored media apparatus to be fairly linear. In fact, different types of media are approached differently, and even this relatively simple model points to other factors influencing media which, while being uniquely Russian, do not devolve into strict governmental controls.

At the center of the CLD, you will find the two tiers of the Russian system which Dunn compares to the Italian system of Lottizzazione. Simply put, Tier 1 media is characterized by tight State control of content and messages while Tier 2 media has a "degree of freedom" [note that no media in Russia is completely free; there is always

the threat of potential government retaliation related to their content.] Tier 1 media includes most TV channels and a significant number of radio and newspaper outlets. Tier 2 media includes some newspaper and radio, but is mostly distinguished by inclusion of the majority of the Internet media producers.

These two tiers are connected to specific audiences based upon where these individuals seek their news; 1st Tier to TV-news centered Russians (which according to 2010 data represent 94% of the populace) and 2nd Tier of Russians mostly connected to Internet-centered news (estimated at less than 10% of the population). Russians in the 1st and 2nd Tiers form the pool of individuals who constitute popular support for the Russian government. Popular support to the regime, to the extent that it exists, has a very strong relationship with the preservation of the State.

Moving from this section over to the left and upper section of the CLD, we can see that the Russian State media authority[6] has an important role in the overall system. It has a direct and strong link to 1st Tier media in that it dictates strategic communication and routinely requires some media outlets to publish specific content. 1st Tier media, in turn, submits content back to higher State authority for approval in a balancing feedback loop as these media outlets seek to preserve their organization and perhaps also curry a little political favor. The State media authority is itself heavily influenced by the ruling elite, namely Vladimir Putin and his inner circle.[7] Also, Russian "narratives" and the concept of "maskirovka" provide ready heuristics which guide media direction in the absence of direct instructions.

To clarify, there are generally considered to be three central Russian narratives: Fortress Russia, Savior of Europe, and the Good Czar. Fortress Russia provides a metaphor for Russia as a besieged nation whose people have an inherent toughness and unity which will inevitably break any potential invaders. A number of historical examples can be cited, and it is a relatively easy story to wrap into nearly any world event whether Russia is truly threatened or not. As well, in the past there were a number of times Russians were not aware of an impending attack until it actually occurred. The Savior of Europe narrative typifies the times Russia has come to the aid of wider Europe, and has been the decisive element in victory. This is mostly tied to WWII, and is a ready justification for the westward expansion of their influence. The Good Czar narrative again harkens back to history and advances the ideal that Russia has been the strongest under firm leadership, and

that all Russians will benefit from strong and decisive leadership in the end—even if it seems harsh and whether or not they specifically agree with the leader. Finally, a quick explanation of the Russian concept of maskirovka. It is sometimes over-simplified as just military "denial and deception," but it tends to go far beyond typical military cover, concealment, misdirection, and the like. In fact, it is central to nearly all Russian political pursuits. It often results in what can seem like knee-jerk denials and lying in the advancement of political interests. Truth is inconsequential when a lie can simply be repeated often enough for some to believe it, or even to just cause a little doubt since misinformation can be used as an excellent temporary delaying tactic. The recent action in Crimea provides a good example. The Russians inserted "rebels" and "humanitarian convoys" while continuously denying any part in the annexation until after it had been completed. The same general principle can be observed in play with wider Russian media activity.

While the State media authority does directly impact the 1st Tier media, the system does not show a direct connection to 2nd Tier media. Research provides some insight as to why they do not appear to have much of a direct relationship. There appears to be a broad recognition as to why direct control of the 2nd Tier (and particularly the Internet) is inadvisable. For one, this "relatively free" media provides a "safety valve" for opposing viewpoints and dissent. Russian authority may well prefer zero opposition, but they are practical enough to know they don't want revolution to be the first indication they have of dissent. Secondly, they have an understanding that Internet access is a requirement for a

complex and modern society. And lastly, there is a need to maintain a certain external image. Namely, they need to be perceived as a relative democracy if they wish to continue to be included in the G8, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe.[8] These three elements are all depicted as negative interconnections because they inhibit governmental controls.

The final section of the CLD is the quite interesting Troll Army[9] "system within a system." While there are actual physical locations, manpower, and financial expenditures associated with the Russian Troll Army, it will be examined here more conceptually. First, a definition is in order. A troll army consists of people, typically young people, who are paid by the State to flood select portions of the Internet with pro-government information. Sometimes this takes the form of a new blog, Facebook or other social media posts. Other times it comes in the form of comments to those very posts or to other news articles and media. It is common to have simultaneous, complementary efforts to influence both domestic and foreign audiences. This is a serious and concerted attempt to shape real-life perception via the virtual domain. There is every indication that modern use of this technique is top-down driven, and that it does support a higher propaganda strategy.

In the CLD, the Troll Army is depicted as being surrounded by a reinforcing loop because once distortion, innuendo, and conjecture are released into the "wild" of the Internet, there is no way to remove it and little that can be done to control what it may morph into. In this loop, the nominal starting point is the introduction of the "trolling"[10] activity. In this case, trolling perhaps falls slightly outside of the typical slang definition. The Troll Army engages in an influence attempt that can be described as "State-sponsored Internet sock puppetry." This term describes the use of a false online identity to sway online opinion, shift what people think of as the dominant viewpoint, or to undermine dissent. Following the loop in the CLD, the next step is often accomplished through a process called "astroturfing." This is essentially the obfuscation of the troll's identity so that a message can be portrayed as coming from the "grassroots." Continuing on the loop, the portrayal of Russian State-sponsored information as being spontaneous bottom-up information often results in the propagation of this material by "useful idiots." People unrelated to the Troll Army that "share" and "like" and otherwise spread the information across social media and the wider Internet, but are blind to the overall goals of the organization which originated it. Finally, the loop is closed as changes to the wider perspective of the Russian government influence further attempts by the State to affect the information environment leading to changing and potentially more effective State-sponsored Internet sock puppetry.

The result of this loop spills out into the information environment, and effects an international audience, although once released into the Internet wilds it is relatively uncontrollable. This impact on international audiences ideally supports the goal of increasing external influence.

The final link on the CLD to discuss is the connection of the Troll Army to 2nd Tier media. This relationship is a balancing feedback loop as the Troll Army appears to be the State

mechanism to stabilize the uncontrolled consequences of a relatively free Internet. The Troll Army takes direction from the State media authority and then follows it to impact and counterbalance the influence of 2nd Tier media. To support this goal, the Troll Army receives and responds to the activity in the 2nd Tier closing this loop. Note that this connection to the 2nd Tier provides the Troll Army with a mechanism to impact Internet news-centric Russian citizens and influence them to support the regime. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that they do exactly that by high levels of activity in community-level websites virtually flooding them with nationalist and pro-Putin comments. Note that the Troll Army retains a higher degree of control over the consequences of their internal reinforcing feedback loop when the audience is strictly internal. Russian data on Russian servers can be effected by the State if need be, and there is pressure that can be brought to bear if 2nd Tier media seeks to take an action in direct opposition to the State, such as an attempt to expose the existence and operations of the Troll Army.

Outcome and Leverage Variables

Now that the system is graphically depicted, it is possible to garner some valuable information about it beginning with the outcome and leverage variables. The outcome variable is the element that is most impacted by the "flow" of the system, and the leverage variable is essentially the fulcrum of the system. What element, if changed, will exert the most force on it? The outcome element of this system appears to be "Popular Support for the Regime" located to the far right of the CLD. 1st and 2nd Tier media both connect only to this element, and popular support is further

connected to the Russian narratives; which in many ways supersede Russian media in that they essentially spring directly from national identity. While "Preservation of the State" was identified as an element impacted by "Popular Support," that does not seem very useful as an outcome element. For one, it is broad and likely impacted by a multitude of factors not presented in this CLD. For another, preservation of the State is very much a "redline" for Russia. It would not be advisable to advance that point in this paper as even a discussion just touching on regime change can have strategic implications.

The leverage element in this system is perhaps less clear, but seems to be the Russian Troll Army. However, this is partly based upon global trends not well captured in this CLD. It is a relative truism and common knowledge that Internet usage is increasing everywhere. A logical extrapolation of this results in the supposition that 2nd Tier media within Russia will gain more prominence, and an increasing number of Russians will obtain their news from Internet sources bypassing Russian State controls over 1st Tier media. Assuming that the Russian government allows individuals and the media a "degree of freedom" on the Internet to provide a safety valve, preserve their external image, and maintain access to modern society, the primary method to influence this growing demographic is through their Troll Army. In addition, the Troll Army appears to be the primary means to reach out and touch international audiences and therefore seems to be integral to Russian international influence.

Global Trends

It is important to recognize that Russia media does not exist in a vacuum. There are global

drivers and trends that impact the system in ways not depicted in the CLD. Recognizing these trends and drivers can deepen our understanding of the system by identifying these external factors and analyzing their effect on Russian media. In a rapidly evolving information environment there are many trends which affect media. There are also a number of trends specific to Russia. These factors were taken into consideration and whittled down to a "top 10."

1. General proliferation of Internet usage
2. Increasing prevalence of social media
3. Emerging use of cyber as an offensive instrument of national power
4. Accelerating technology allowing for increased access to information
5. Worsening Russian fiscal situation
6. Increased Russian political willingness to use cyber capability for political gain
7. Russia demonstrating increasing expansionist tendencies
8. Increasing Russian State-control over citizenry
9. Worsening U.S./RUS relations (possibly subject to change)
10. Decrease in the importance of TV news programming as more people seek news from Internet sources

The global trends above act as exogenous variables as they are external factors effecting the Russian media system. However, there are also endogenous variables which should be taken into account. These variables are internal and inherent to Russia media. There are six identified as the most important considerations. The top six endogenous variables are:

1. State-run media's need to maintain or gain budget

2. Inner circle and State media leadership desire to stay in political favor
3. Need to retain and recruit trolls, especially those with foreign language expertise
4. Potential for unfavorable and transparent election results to damage regime
5. 2nd Tier media contradiction of 1st Tier media reporting
6. Regime willingness to control media if that's what it takes to remain in power

To take this analysis a little further, let's explore what may drive a specific condition Russia may seek in the future. Will Russia seek to shift priority of control from 1st tier media towards greater direct control over their 2nd tier media? This seems to be a very real possibility as a reaction to more Russians beginning to consume news and other media from Internet sources. Figure 2 depicts this scenario. In the center is the possible issue of a Russian decision to shift their media control efforts to be more Internet centric. Since we have identified endogenous and exogenous variables at play with Russian media in the above lists, we can examine what is supporting or inhibiting this condition.

In Figure 2, the forces working towards this state are list on the left, and those working against it are on the right. The size of the arrows reflects the strength of the force at play, as do the numbers (rated on a scale from 1 to 10). The resulting Force Field Analysis demonstrates that the forces working for the change are greater and stronger than the forces working against it. Most notably, a general proliferation of Internet usage and the regime's strong desire to remain in power are pushing towards an

increased Russian control over 2nd Tier media. However, there are factors working against such a change, the strongest of which are the desires of 1st Tier media to retain their budgets and power position within the state, the difficulty in finding the talent required to allow the public access to the Internet while still exercising a tight control over content, and the Russian need to keep a reasonable relationship with the US to maintain trade and diplomatic freedom of action.

To continue the analysis, it's reasonable to ask the question of what would happen if the Russian government were to take the step of

percentage above the directional arrow. In addition, each effect is assessed as either positive or negative **from the U.S. perspective.** This is depicted as a green oval for positive to U.S. policy makers and as a red oval for negative.

Out of the myriad of first-order effects that could occur, two are examined in Figure 3. Of these, one seems uniformly negative from the position of the U.S.: Russia successfully uses this media control to influence their populace to support territorially expansionist national policy. A second-order effect of this would be to strengthen public support for an increasing military buildup with third-order effects of a

Force Field Analysis

Proliferation of internet usage — 8

Increasing social media — 5

Accelerating tech — 3

Willingness to use cyber — 5

Regime desire to remain in power — 9

Russia seeks to shift priority of control from 1st tier media toward greater direct control over their 2nd tier media as more Russian begin to consume news and other media from internet sources

4 — Worsening fiscal

5 — Difficulty finding talent

7 — 1st Tier desire maintain budget

5 — US/ Russian relationship

Figure 2.

establishing control over 2nd Tier media, to include their citizens' use of the Internet. One way to look at this is to create an Implications Tree. This analysis places the change at the center and branches out to depict first-, second- and third-order effects of this change. As none of these effects are guaranteed to occur, each has its likelihood assessed and recorded as a

new U.S./RUS arms race or a "use it or lose it" mentality; the idea being when two large militaries face off, victory goes to the one who strikes first. Another possible second-order effect is that the Russian government uses the support for expansion to fuel a drive into neighboring territory. Third-order effects to this action are proxy wars or increased

asymmetric attacks to gain more territory at the margins as has indeed already occurred in Crimea and Georgia.

relations. A very different potential second-order effect is that Russian preoccupation with internal affairs would lead to increased security

Figure 3.

A different first-order effect has more potential positive outcomes for the U.S., but doesn't seem nearly as likely. Russia could find control over 2nd Tier media so difficult that they would need to expend so much of their resources on internal control that they no longer have the time or resources to consider expansionist policy. A second-order effect to this potential reality that seems likely is that it would increase cronyism and corruption within Russia. The third-order effects are a certain increase in wealth and power disparity and a less much less certain possibility of popular resentment which leads to significant protest and civil unrest. The latter could be a positive outcome for the U.S. as long as it leads to a more open society and friendlier U.S./RUS

for Eastern European nations. This would almost certainly lead to greater Westernization of these countries and increased trade opportunities for the U.S.

Working forward from the Implications Tree, we can build an Alternative Scenarios Matrix as shown in Figure 4. This matrix allows us to examine two possible environmental changes and their potential interaction with each other to produce a quad chart with four potential scenarios. This chart can help to remove some of the uncertainty within the environment.

Along the y-axis, we explore varying degrees of control over 2nd Tier media that Russia may apply. At the top, we have "relatively free." This is the status quo where Russia mostly only influences 2nd Tier media with their Troll Army efforts. At the bottom is a scenario where 2nd Tier is tightly controlled and, among other things, Russian citizens no longer have Internet access to free and open information. Along the x-axis, the Russian government focuses on regime preservation and controlling their internal population on the left side, and to the right they focus on influencing their population to support Russian territorial expansion. This creates four possible quadrants.


Figure 4.

In the upper left, we have the "March of the Trolls." In this scenario, the open nature of the Internet provides the Russian population with a multitude of new viewpoints and ideas. The State fears the changes that may develop from this, but still acknowledges that a modern society requires access to information. So, they continue (and perhaps increase) their Troll Army efforts to counter what they perceive as a negative Western influence. People still have relatively open access to information, but they are very consistently assailed with propaganda

and sophisticated influence efforts. Many Russian citizens feel that they can tell the difference and think independently, but they are largely mistaken. Troll Army officials gain stature and influence as their efforts become a central feature of regime preservation.

The upper right quadrant is "Springtime for Putin." In this scenario, Russian influence efforts are so effective that Russian citizens almost completely on their own begin to disregard Western influence streaming over the Internet. Russian narratives are so strong, and resentment for the West runs so deep, that the Troll Army shifts efforts away from internal control and focuses extensively on fostering a desire to expand Russian territory and regain stature in the world. Russian leadership would be able to plan a number of expansionary schemes and expect that the Russian population would be willing to sacrifice to support them. The regime would feel itself to be in the very strong position of enjoying popular support even if expansion were causing what it would doubtless call "short-term" deprivation. Hope for a resurgent Russia would bloom eternal.

The bottom left quadrant, "Pravda Reborn," is perhaps the least desirable from the Russian standpoint. The Russian government decides to exercise strict control over 2nd Tier media, but the effort is so consuming that they must focus almost exclusively on internal control of their population. All information must be approved by the State, and penalties for "unofficial news" are severe. Russia would be a stark place where "informing" on neighbors would be common, and no one could be fully trusted. It

seems likely that this sort of system would eventually collapse under its own weight, much as it did in the recent past in the Soviet Union. Before it did collapse, however, it would wreak a good bit of societal devastation.

Finally, the bottom right quadrant is "Thunder in the West." In this scenario, the Russian government is controlling 2nd Tier media and effectively using it to influence popular support for the establishment of new Mother Russia. The regime would sound a near-continuous drumbeat about the great destiny of the Russian people and argue for the restoration of the territorial lines of the Soviet Union. "Cry 'Havoc!', and let slip the dogs of war." This scenario is certainly quite dangerous for the West, even if the threat would likely be nakedly obvious. At the least, it would spark a costly Cold War and force the U.S. to make some very difficult decisions about the defense of Eastern Europe.

Armed with these four scenarios, we can next use a Stress Test to examine how policy or strategy might be postured to deal with them. The purpose of this test is to inform strategic thinking by assessing how current U.S. policy stacks up against each of these scenarios and assesses it as green, amber, or red against each (Figure 5). In addition, the Stress Test is then used to assess how a recommended U.S. policy would perform in each of these scenarios (Figure 6).

The current U.S. policy with regard to Russian use of influence and propaganda is not particularly well defined. Mostly, it is centered on exposing Russian lies as they occur primarily on an ad hoc basis. This is accomplished through a combination of press releases, statements made at levels as high as

the POTUS (Strategic Communication), and through reliance on free and independent (mostly U.S.-based) media reporting. This reactive and fairly weak approach can only do so much to counter a concerted and practiced state-centered apparatus such as Russia's.

The policy as it stands would likely satisfy the requirements of the Pravda Reborn scenario since Russia would be inwardly focused on tight informational control of their internal population. The U.S. would continue to provide truthful information to the international community in a non-aggressive fashion on the assumption that some of it will find its way into Russia and contribute to the system eventually collapsing under its own weight. The effects may be a slower than a more aggressive information stance, but would likely have an eventual impact.

Similarly, the current U.S. policy would partly satisfy the requirements of March of the Trolls. In this scenario, U.S. information will certainly find its way across the borders into a relatively open Russia, but an aggressive Troll Army would likely enjoy much success in countering it. Still, the Russian government will be focused on internal population control and not represent a great threat to U.S. interests. One can suppose that the evolving nature of the Internet and the continuing free flow of information would one day result in a significantly more liberal and open Russian society in this scenario.

Where the current U.S. policy falls short is in both instances where the Russian regime uses their media capabilities to focus on expansion, whether they keep their 2nd Tier media relatively free or not. In both Springtime for Putin and Thunder in the West, U.S.

information policy can do little to affect a growing desire towards nationalism and expansion. The U.S. approach is simply too weak to impact a message which is predicated on strength, whether the Russian message is spread through the Troll Army or through strict governmental media controls. In these scenarios, the U.S. would be forced to rely on other means of national power to veer the Russian government from this dangerous course.

Figure 5.

Given the relative weakness of current U.S. information policy as it pertains to countering Russian influence, there are several changes worth considering. First, the U.S. should establish a United States Information Department (USID) in order to fully recognize and manage the "I" element of national power (DIME). A blueprint of sorts for this does exist in the form of the largely defunct or marginalized shell of the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA) which existed between 1953 and 1999. Before being subsumed into the Department of State, the USIA can be said to have had a key role in ending the Cold War on terms very favorable to the U.S. I advocate resurrecting the organization and elevating leadership to a Secretary-level position. Second, the U.S. should establish a more aggressive information posture. There are significant levels of cyber, social media, and traditional media expertise resident in the U.S. that could be used to

accomplish information-related objectives in ways that they are currently not. The newly established USID would be the perfect vehicle to channel this expertise. Lastly, clearer and more enduring strategic communication would help to focus information efforts more effectively. Currently, strategic communication is very often gleaned from Presidential speeches and the like, and is quite dependent on the personality of whoever is elected POTUS - as well as their experiences while growing into the office. Information policy can shift rapidly and be relatively uncertain year in and year out. Contrast this with the relative steadiness of U.S. military programs and policy and one can see how information-related systems stand out as much less consistent than other vital national considerations.

As shown in in Figure 6, these recommended policy changes are postulated to result in a more effective response to potential Russian information activities. They would fully satisfy the requirements under March of the Trolls and Pravda Reborn as properly focused (and funded) U.S. media expertise will prove to be more than a match for Russian efforts. It is quite reasonable to believe that Russian resources would be overmatched in these scenarios. However, the revised policy is less likely to be fully effective when the Russian government focuses their efforts on encouraging an expansionist Russia, such as in the Springtime for Putin and Thunder in the West scenarios. The reasoning behind this assessment is that the power of the cultural Russian narratives runs too deep for U.S. influence to fully convince Russian citizens. However, it is likely that there can be enough doubt placed into the public consciousness that

Russia can perhaps be swayed from taking the most dangerous road, especially after diplomatic, military, and economic pressures are applied.

Figure 6.

In summary, the Russian media system is complex but understandable. Their control of more traditional media is strong, but they have a considerably softer touch with less traditional media, the Internet media in particular. The two tier system this creates produces something of a gap in the "2nd Tier" of their influence efforts that they fill by use of a Troll Army. With this capability, they augment the influence over internal audiences they exert with "1st Tier" media and also reach out to external audiences. This system was depicted by a **Casual Loop Diagram** (CLD) that was then used as the starting point for identifying **Global Trends** and **Endogenous Variables,** factors which effect the system but aren't necessarily pictured in the CLD. Both these internal and external variables were incorporated into a **Force Field Analysis** to examine the possibility of a Russian decision to apply their media control ethic to include 2nd Tier media. This, in turn, informed an **Implications Tree** that analyzed potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of this possibility as well as determining their probability and impact on U.S. policy and strategy. The Implications Tree served as the basis for an **Alternative Scenarios Matrix** which laid out four possible futures based upon a Russian decision of level of control of 2nd

Tier, and to what use they turn their influence efforts. And finally, these scenarios were examined through the lens of current and proposed US policy, and subjected to a **Stress Test**.

In the overall findings, it appears that the central reason for the Russian media control system (or the outcome element) is "Popular Support for the Regime," and the most versatile and potentially powerful tool they have to effect this (the leverage element) is the "Russian Troll Army." Exogenous and endogenous trends are currently pushing the Russian government towards the step of exerting direct government control over their 2nd Tier media with implications that are likely to be bad for the U.S., Russian citizens, and the wider European community. In four possible future scenarios envisioned, current US policy is generally inadequate in addressing them. To more fully address the strategic environment foreseen by this analysis, a revised U.S. information policy is needed. This policy should feature the establishment of a United States Information Department, a more aggressive information posture, and clearer and enduring strategic communication.

Author Biography.

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[6] Note that better identification and system mapping of this authority is desirable, but beyond the scope of this work.

[7] See footnote 2. A worthy study, but well beyond the current scope of this paper.

[8] Russia seems to prefer to view itself as a "guided democracy." A fact I only include because that's just a great turn of phrase, isn't it?

[9] The web brigades, also known in English media as the troll army, are state-sponsored anonymous Internet political commentators and trolls linked to Russian government. (Source of definition: Wikipedia: 06 NOV 16)

[10] In Internet slang, a troll is a person who sows discord on the Internet by starting arguments or upsetting people, by posting inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in an online community with the deliberate intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or of otherwise disrupting normal on-topic discussion. (Source of definition: Wikipedia: 06 NOV 16)

The Role of Innovation Cells in DoD Innovation

by

CDR James Darkenwald, LCDR Christopher Casne, and MAJ Trevor Voelkel

During the conflict, losses by the enemy were unsustainable - their heavy armored vehicles were no match for our ingenuity, field expediency, and the creativity of our foot-soldiers. My ground commanders quickly and efficiently engineered a field expedient solution to defeat the enemy's armored threat. Identification of the issue to an engineered solution took a mere 30 days to get the new explosive charge to the front lines. Not only did the charges make it to the front lines quickly but exportable training packages were also distributed and implemented across my entire areas of control. Within three to four months, 90% of the battlespace had the capability to defeat the enemy's armored and dismounted threats. Industry was able to produce up to 8,000 explosive devices per year with the average cost of around $250 per unit. The average cost of the enemy's armored vehicles ranged between $500,000 and $1,500,000 and took exponentially more time to produce.

Unfortunately, the above story is not a vignette of a successful U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition and innovation process—this is a story from the perspective of the Taliban in Afghanistan based on actual experiences by U.S. Commanders. The Taliban were able to quickly identify the strength of the Coalition forces and were innovative in finding a way to counter it utilizing the now infamous improvised explosive device (IED).

How can the U.S. Joint Force transform ideas from thought to implementation as quickly as our adversaries? What organizations do they turn to if they have ideas? If there is an organization or command that can receive their ideas? Do they have the means to implement them? Although still a relatively small sample size, specialized innovation cells have quickly proven successful in driving innovation throughout the DoD. The Department's culture, contracting timelines, and the typical hierarchal organizational structure has proven ineffective in quickly adapting to our adversary. Highlighting this is the fact that from 2001 to 2011 the Defense Department spent over $46 billion on a dozen weapons systems that never even entered production. That is more money than the combined annual budgets of NASA, the FBI, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Currently, there is a clear focus on innovation at the very top of the DoD. Former Defense Secretary (SecDef) Chuck Hagel announced in November 2014 the Defense Innovative Initiative (DII) and with it, the "3rd Offset Strategy." This initiative was described by Hagel *"… as an ambitious, department wide effort to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and advance America's military dominance for the 21st century."*[1] Additionally, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey said in 2013, "*…we need to expand our concept of*

what innovation means. Innovation is about new stuff and new ideas. We must prioritize innovation not only in our material solutions, but also in our warfighting concepts, organizational constructs, and relationships."[2]

From its inception, the DoD has been at the cutting edge of innovation; however, recent conflicts have proven that the Department's construct is too slow to effectively adjust to an ever-changing adversary. This innovation gap is due primarily to the DoD's cumbersome acquisition process and large bureaucracy. For the Department to get back to its roots of out innovating its enemy, it must find an effective way to drive impactful change through innovation without fundamentally changing its time-tested construct. The DoD's current signature innovation project, Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental 2.0 attempts to do exactly that and therefore deserves further study. Additionally, innovation cell examples are sprouting up throughout the DoD with solid results and thought provoking lessons learned. The United States European Command (EUCOM) Rapid Innovation Cell (ERIC) and the Chief of Naval Operations' Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) are two such innovation cells that require further evaluation. In a time of ever-tightening budgets and increasingly innovative adversaries, the DoD can no longer rely on its 18th Century construct and 20th Century acquisition process to drive innovation from within. The employment of specialized innovations cells spread throughout every facet of the DoD would drive innovation within the U.S. Joint Force and potentially

lower ever increasing acquisition costs and timelines.

DoD Innovation

When former SecDef Hagel announced DII he was hoping the program would launch the department into a game changing "3rd Offset Strategy." An offset strategy is nothing more than a strategy which seeks to leverage the U.S.' innovative strength to counter an adversary's strength. The first two U.S. offset strategies came in the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. The 1st offset strategy launched during the beginning of the Cold War as the U.S. and NATO sought advantages over the Soviet Union to offset their enormous conventional strength. The 1950s saw the Soviet Union able to bring to bear 192 divisions in a conventional war.[3] It was impossible for the alliance to match that conventional strength so they sought to offset that by developing their nuclear arsenal. Not just by sheer numbers, the U.S. looked to its advantage of reliable and technologically superior weaponry and delivery systems. This nuclear deterrence would counter the Soviet Union until the 1970s when they began to reach parity with the U.S.[4]

The 2nd Offset Strategy examined how the U.S. could counter Russia's nuclear arsenal while still addressing the large Soviet troop strength. The idea that was born was to utilize conventional munitions with a zero-miss probability. From this simple idea, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was given the mission to determine how to defeat the Soviet's large formations with a "deep attack." This was a

true example of innovation from both a technology and organizational perspective. The Russians (in the early 1980s) surmised that these precision conventional munitions would achieve the same destructive effects (as tactical nuclear weapons) and thus the U.S. effectively offset the Russian strengths while requiring them to spend enormous amounts of capital on countering the U.S. advantages—effectively ending the Cold War by bankrupting the Russians.

The 2nd Offset Strategy helped produce new technologies such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), precision munitions, intelligence/surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, and new delivery systems (stealth) with global reach. This highly successful strategy provided decisive operational advantage for almost four decades. The DoD's current advantages are beginning to dissipate as more and more nation, non-nation states, and terrorist organizations gain similar advantages with the increasing pace of technology proliferation.[5]

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter built on Hagel's vision by providing further support of the 3rd Offset Strategy with $3.6 billion toward the FY 2017 Defense Budget.[6] One of the largest differences between the 3rd Offset Strategy and the previous two is that it is not aligned against a single known actor (Figure 1). As Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Work stated, this strategy is focused on "*...multiple potential competitors, from small regional states like North Korea and Iran, to large advanced states like Russia and China, to non-state adversaries and actors with advanced capabilities.*"[7] This new strategy

must be flexible, creative and agile to succeed in today's world. The DoD must combine future technology with innovative operational concepts to create an advantage over our future adversaries. The luxury of choosing one specific strategy focused on deterring or defeating one adversary is no longer a reality. Innovative agility will be a cornerstone of future success by the DoD.

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
Figure 1.

Defense Innovation Unit- Experimental (DIUx)

Realizing the vital need for innovation within the DoD, Secretary Carter announced the creation of the Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx) in April 2015 in Silicon Valley.

The mission of DIUx is as follows:

"As *our name implies, DIUx is just that: an "experiment." We continuously iterate on how best to identify, contract, and prototype novel innovations through sources traditionally not available to the Department of Defense, with the ultimate goal of accelerating technology into the hands of the men and women in uniform.*"

DIUx scouts emerging and breakthrough technologies and builds direct relationships to DoD.[8] Since its inception, it has undergone significant adaptations and growth. Most notably, it opened new offices in Boston in July 2016 and Austin in September 2016. Prior to these openings, Secretary Carter noticed DIUx was not fully meeting his intent and potential; consequently, he changed the operating concept by introducing DIUx 2.0 in May of 2016. Version 2.0 included a consolidated reporting structure, with DIUx reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a leadership team comprised of partners with experience in technology, strategy, business and management.[9]

Despite being in operation for just 18 months, DIUx has awarded more than $36 million in contracts to both small and large companies focusing on innovative solutions to the department's most vexing challenges. DIUx most notable contract thus far is a $12.6 million "high speed drone" to work alongside the Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Smaller contracts include a $153K head-worn stimulation system contract that theoretically can increase the brain's natural ability to adapt to training. To date, DIUx has realized a 66% cost savings and 50% time savings over typical DoD research, design, and acquisition processes.[10]

EUCOM Rapid Innovation Cell

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Rapid Innovation Cell (ERIC) was established in December 2015 by the EUCOM Deputy Commander (DCOM), Lieutenant General William Garrett, in an effort to spur innovation within the command. A re-emerging threat from Russia, immigration crises, and ever-present terrorist activity within the EUCOM area of operations (AO) requires an innovative culture when the status quo is no longer acceptable. With the overall goal of creating a culture of innovation at the combatant command, the ERIC was established to "get after" innovation from within and cultivate it throughout.

ERIC's slogan is that it "provides a forum to make the Joint Force better through powerful ideas, unique solutions, and intellectual courage."[11] The group consists of a collection of individuals from multiple disciplines within the EUCOM Headquarters staff. A mix of officers and enlisted personnel from

each of EUCOM's core directorates (Administration, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Future Plans, Communication, and Legislative Affairs), the ERIC is a directed collateral duty for the team's six to eight personnel. The intention behind the team's construct is to ensure innovation is interwoven into the day to day business of EUCOM, vice a primary duty where the ERIC personnel would possibly be viewed as outsiders trying to push innovation on those that "work for a living."

The two initial goals for the ERIC are 1) to establish a simple, easy to understand submission and idea selection process and 2) partner with industry to establish important private/public relations and learn from the way private industry incorporates innovation into its business models. The ERIC focuses on innovations that have Joint Force impacts and ideally will make EUCOM more efficient and effective as a combatant command; however, all ideas (no matter how big or how small) are welcome.

Construct of the ERIC submission and idea selection process were modeled off of a combination of current and former military innovation cells as well as what that the team noted from their experience partnering with industry. The main purpose of the construct was to make it easy to understand and fair/impartial to implement (see Figure 2. ERIC Submission and Selection Process).

Figure 2.

Once per quarter the group hosts a selection forum for the top ideas that were submitted for that particular quarter. The innovation submission owners of those top ideas are brought to EUCOM Headquarters to brief the DCOM and ERIC team in a relaxed environment. Presenters are given the flexibility to present in any way that they choose with PowerPoint (i.e. the DoD's "go to" briefing platform) as the least preferred option. Ideally, once innovations are selected and granted ERIC approval, they are then cultivated by the idea originator (i.e. "owner") as well as an assigned ERIC team member. The long-term goal is to incorporate each selected innovation into an existing program of record with a sustainable funding source. ERIC has received over 60 innovative submissions in the cell's first year of existence, eight of which have been selected for cultivation and resourcing. The most notable that has been implemented thus far by the ERIC is the automated EUCOM morning update brief that pulls data from existing sources (instead of manual entry) and therefore saves an average of 40 man hours per week.

Chief of Naval Operations' Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC)

Founded by the CNO in 2012, the CRIC was established to "provide junior leaders with an opportunity to identify and rapidly field emerging technologies that address the Navy's most pressing challenges" of being a Force that requires massive monetary investment to greatly increase combat effectiveness.[12] The CRIC capitalized on the unique perspective and familiarity that junior leaders possess regarding modern warfare, revolutionary ideas, and disruptive technologies. The CRIC's primary missions were to rapidly bring new concepts and technologies into the Navy and to build a culture of innovation within the Navy. For the first mission, the CRIC was very successful; the success of the second mission is undetermined as the CRIC was disestablished in the spring of 2016 due to funding impacts.

In only three years, the CRIC brought additive manufacturing to ships, highlighted augmented reality in the workplace, and used data analytics and machine learning in new ways to drastically reduce the time and cost of integrating systems of maintaining aircraft. The CRIC enabled the reprioritization of over $1 billion in Navy investment during its three year lifespan at minimal cost to the U.S. taxpayers; however, the CRIC was established in the middle of sequestration as a special project and as a result faced an uphill climb from the start. Consequently, the CRIC was disestablished in 2016 in a likely congressional attempt to take a firm stand against unnecessary spending.

Innovation Cell Lessons Learned

The lessons learned by DoD Innovation Cells in general and the ERIC through the program's first year of existence have been numerous. Outside of leadership buy-in (which is required for innovation to succeed at any level), the innovation cell lessons learned can be broken down into five broad categories; speed, DoD mindset change, private/public partnering, dedicated innovation funding, and information operations (IO).

Speed

The iterative process from identifying a problem to producing a viable solution isn't easy. Combine the normal challenges with the complex DoD acquisition process and hierarchal structure and you face some serious headwinds when trying to innovate. Several years can pass from the time it takes to develop a concept, present it to the right government agency, create a project, and make a contract award.[13] For example, the process of conceiving of a new project at DARPA, getting it approved and funded, and then selecting and awarding contracts, will typically take two years.[14] The humbling fact is that DARPA is considered one of the "faster" organizations at navigating this process by DoD standards. These same challenges are experienced by all levels of government, to include the innovation cells that were put in place to help "speed" things up. It became quickly apparent, to teams like

the ERIC, that changes at higher levels of government were needed if the innovative ideas and solutions were to succeed beyond the concept phase.

A good example of how DoD is trying to adapt to the constraints of the acquisition cycle is the *NAVY Program Executive Office Enterprise Information System- Innovation Cell (IC).* This innovation cell is an example of how an enterprise, NAVY PEO (Program Executive Office), has made an attempt to bridge the gap between industry innovation and Navy Enterprise I.T. acquisition. Tying together the pull of ideas (i.e., problems, solutions) to the means of funding is critical to making innovation work. Navy PEO is attempting to deliver a fundamental change in how the Navy acquires technology. As the speed characteristic of industry innovation is helping drive the DoD to modify acquisition cycles, this innovation cell is attempting to lead the Navy's charge into the commercially available technology arena by delivering technology and acquisition insight to Navy programs as a whole.[15] The cell is working closely with Program Management Offices (PMOs), and Industry, to help drive timely, innovative solutions for enterprise-wide needs. New approaches like these and other innovative ways of working within the constraints of our current system are needed if DoD stands a chance at winning the battle against time.

DoD Mindset Change

"Even though it can be counterproductive to an efficient operation and cost the organization time and money, radical innovation development is the best way to introduce the significantly different products and services."[16] Radical innovation requires significant risk of failure. For innovation to truly thrive, the fear of failure must be eliminated within an organization…in fact, innovation and failure are synonymous. For companies like Apple and Google, failure is just part of their business model; for the DoD failure is, many times, not an option.

The ERIC quickly realized that many of their innovations were doomed for failure shortly after they were selected for cultivation—explaining this failure to senior leaders proved very challenging. If innovation is to truly thrive within the DoD, the acceptance of innovative failure is critical. Leadership sets the climate within the DoD and innovation can only thrive if creativity is encouraged, trust is established and the fear of trying new things is minimized. WD40 was given its name (Water Displacement 40) because the mixture failed the first 39 times it was attempted...this amazingly innovative product now accounts for annual sales of over $350M.[17]

There are certainly areas within the DoD where failure is still not an option. Innovation happens to not be one of those areas. Leaders at all levels within the department must understand this dichotomy for innovation to truly thrive.

Innovation faces DoD cultural challenges, which will manifest themselves well into the future. Some of the cultural challenges are basic to the way DoD organizations are structured. The typical stove-piped

hierarchical construct doesn't always allow for the quick communication and action needed for innovation to succeed. Depending on where you sit, there are many barriers that create challenges moving up and down in the organization. It only gets worse when you take into account the challenge of trying to "cross" organizations.

Private/Public Partnering

DoD innovation has been reliant on a strong public/private partnership for many years. The ERIC realized this pivotal link early on and therefore quickly established partnering opportunities with Adidas, DaimlerChrysler, IBM and many other large successful companies within Germany (i.e. the location of EUCOM HQ). The two main takeaways from these experiences were that 1) innovation must become part of the DNA of an organization, it cannot be forced or coerced, and 2) private industry isn't afraid to take chances on big ideas if the potential is there. Whereas the DoD innovates incrementally within its existing products and services, private industry leadership often times encourages "more radical innovation in the organization so they can remain competitive".[18]

Partnerships are only as strong as the efforts by both parties to strengthen and cultivate the relationship. The ERIC team quickly realized that private industry is infinitely more flexible and adaptable than the DoD at taking on a new partner. Innovation cells must think differently (within the confines of what's legally and morally allowable) to ensure that these pivotal private industry relationships

are cultivated and co-beneficial in nature. Working together with private industry is absolutely key to long term success of DoD innovation. With its private industry construct, DIUx is greatly increasing the acceptance of this practice and breaking down barriers that previously existed between private industry and the DoD...this may well prove to the future of Federal government innovation.

Dedicated Innovation Funding

Although dedicated funding proved to be the undoing for the CRIC, mandating direct access to funding is critical to success of DoD innovation cells. Many of the innovative ideas the ERIC cultivated over the past year were stalled due to lack of funding and/or a program of record. The conflict to fund innovation arises when sound and logical business decisions do not take into account the "possibilities" for adopting radical innovations.[19] Leaders must make funding innovation a priority. Either a set-a-side source of money needs to be established for innovative ideas at an organization level or the Defense Acquisition community must create a flexible acquisition process for quick, small procurements tied to innovation. These acquisition vehicles already exist for organizations such as USAID that typically cannot wait for the contract vetting process; however, innovation cells do not have the authorities in place to utilize them.

The second portion of funding that should be addressed for a DoD innovation cell to succeed is to have at least one full-time person dedicated to the cell. Although

keeping innovation internal to each directorate/department at a combatant command is important, there must still be one person that focuses on innovation on a full time basis. Collateral duties are a priority only until the full time job gets busy.

SecDef Ashton Carter providing further support of the 3rd Offset Strategy with $3.6 billion toward the FY 2017 Defense Budget and establishing DIUx will hopefully lead to direct funding for other innovation groups and efforts. Establishing flexible acquisition vehicles and learning from the CRIC's mistake of making innovation a line item budget item will be key to realizing this essential goal.

Information Operations (i.e. advertising)

Like all businesses and government departments, results matter. Consequently, effectively advertising successes is pivotal to long-term success of innovation cells. Innovation cells must use all means necessary (e.g., social media, radio, newspapers, TV, etc.) to tell the story of who they are, what they have done, and how they are going to make the Joint force better.

The ERIC utilized Super Bowl TV commercials as a way of introducing the organization to the broader Europe DoD audience. By mid-March, over 20 innovation submissions had been received. With the exception of the ERIC's Super Bowl commercials, the most significant event for the innovation cell was an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) demonstration showcased for the EUCOM directors. The event started with

approximately 10 people and grew to well over 50 people within the first hour. The number and type of off-shoot ideas that occurred as a result of this simple event demonstrated that a large part of creating an innovative culture is simply allowing an environment where creative convergences can occur.

Although "rapid" is the second word of the acronym ERIC, making changes (even obvious ones) in a timely manner has proven to be a major challenge. The DoD needs to, as CNO Adm. John Richardson said, "fail often, fail early." The 3rd Offset Strategy calls for rapid prototyping and experimentation to help deliver breakthroughs in key areas. However, before the DoD can approach rapid prototyping and experimentation, the Department needs a clear and enduring way to target key problems, establish partnerships with industry, and develop the processes and policies to gather and select potential solutions to those problems--quickly!

Way Forward

Too often the aforementioned acquisition methodology and bureaucratic processes of the DoD proves too costly and slow to provide the warfighter the product they require when they require it. The DoD has some of the brightest minds in the world and specialized innovation cells can be utilized as a way to harness (i.e., crowdsource) all of their creative talent and ideas. To be effective, DoD needs to take into account the above lessons learned and the experience gleaned from these specialized innovation cells and related organizations that have

made headway in furthering innovation within the DoD. Key challenges can be overcome by keeping in mind some specific ideas.

Bring forward problems and solutions quickly. Cultural and organizational structure problems are natural impediments. This is why these beacons of innovation like DIUx, ERIC, CRIC, and NAVY PEO-EIS excel. At their most basic level, these cells provide the ways, through a dedicated process, to highlight issues and help champion solutions to the subject matter experts and organizations that can carry them forward. One of the key advantages to these innovation cells is that they sit outside of the typical stove-piped DoD bureaucratic structures. This construct allows them to reach up and down, and across enterprises. This quick communication provides a rapid way to "cross-pollinate" ideas and problems that would otherwise be unknown to those outside of the small nucleus within the organization where the problem, or solution, resides.

Provide the means to execute. If innovation is important, DoD leadership needs not only to support these innovation cells organizationally but monetarily, too. These cells have been relatively inexpensive, but their impact has been shown to provide a very high level of "return on investment." It is essential that DoD sustain existing cells, encourage new ones, and develop established pathways for information to flow within the inter- and intra-

organizational networks and critical outside sources of innovation. It is increasingly difficult for organizations to argue to maintain these innovation cells in an environment of shrinking personnel, resources, and funding. Supporting these innovation cells that help generate the ideas is crucial so that the rapid prototyping and experimentation can take place in organizations downstream.

Partner with industry. The experiment known as DIUx has taken on a big role in bringing DoD and industry together. The individual cells have also shown initiative in bringing together industry. However, this shouldn't be left as an "experiment" only. This level of engagement should be a normal way of doing business and it should be coordinated. Further expansion and coordination amongst innovation cells and industry is required to help leverage this engagement. DIUx and other innovation cells should actively support conferences, innovation-jams, and other engagements to bring together DoD personnel and industry experts to help learn from each other and leverage various backgrounds and perspectives to tackle problems facing each side. As the level of awareness of DoD issues begins to circulate amongst the innovation network, further refinement and coordination on topics discussed will help drive thought and problem solving to where innovation is most needed. Proper execution will act as a force multiplier to what is already being accomplished within DoD.

Figure 3.

Communicate the process. If someone has an idea, we need to be consistent and effective at communicating who they can turn to. At the very minimum DoD needs to provide a "road map" of the network that links commands, enterprises, and other organizations to these innovation cells and other nodes within the network. People need to know where they can plug-in if they have an idea or solution. Showing the linkages to not only the innovation cells, but between like-minded organizations like Science and Technology departments and DoD's Rapid Reaction Technology Office are some examples of how we can leverage potential sources of knowledge and help. Again, the goal is to identify the problem and solution quickly! To do this, everyone needs to know how they fit inside the network and who they need to contact.

Taking into account the above ideas, the graphic below (Figure 2) shows a notional relationship between the key players in DoD innovation, specialized innovation cells, industry, and the centers of innovation within DoD.

By relying on traditional culture, structure, and processes, the DoD risks falling victim to the tyranny of time and a bureaucracy that is not supportive, efficient, or geared toward rapid innovation. Even more troubling, if the DoD creates these initiatives/cells and then allows them to "fail," the end effect for U.S. Forces is a clear signal that innovation isn't truly valued (the CRIC disestablishment is a clear example of this lack of foresight).

Conclusion

The DoD faces a growing set of innovative adversaries that are not waiting for the U.S.

to catch up, do not use the same rulebook, often do not wear uniforms, and in some cases, can conduct an act of war from their couch. Their ability to be nimble and skirt the ethical and moral values the U.S. defends only compounds the risk. To compete in the rapidly changing battlespace with ever-tightening budgets, the DoD must change the way it approaches innovation. It must back-up high level innovation talk by aggressively supporting initiatives such as specialized innovation cells. If sustained and empowered, innovation cells can set conditions to quickly turn the Department's disadvantages of cumbersome acquisition processes and its bureaucratic construct into a "game changing" advantage by leveraging the ideas of the department's immensely talented and innovative workforce. Success of the 3rd Offset Strategy and resultant continued U.S. military dominance in the 21st Century may very well depend upon it.

Author Biographies

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Applying the Clausewitzian Trinity to Assess and Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations: A Case Study on ISIS.

by

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Note: The Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) known as Daesh, Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will be referred to as ISIS for the purposes of this paper.

Introduction

The retaking of Ramadi by U.S. trained Iraqi forces in 2015 was viewed by many as confirmation of the U.S. approach to defeating ISIS. By that time, ISIS had lost up to 40 percent of its holdings in Iraq and 10 percent in Syria. Coalition attacks on ISIS' financial resources were hindering its sustainment efforts and ISIS's battlefield losses included up to 20,000 fighters since 2014.[1] To many, it appeared as though the U.S. and its coalition partners were winning the fight.

Despite such reversals, ISIS continued to be very much alive at the operational and strategic levels. In 2016, White House officials acknowledged ISIS forces could still be over 25,000, suggesting ISIS recruiting efforts were overcoming battlefield losses. ISIS forces still controlled key locations throughout the Euphrates River Valley, Sunni Arab tribal regions in eastern Syria and western Iraq, and power bases in Mosul and Raqqa.[2] ISIS' campaign had grown from a regional effort to one that was global in scope; with affiliates emerging in locations from Palestine to Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and African states.[3] Through high-production social media campaigns, ISIS' message resonated with a small but dangerous minority of Muslims worldwide.[4]

This uneven record of progress raises questions about the long-term efficacy of the U.S. strategy against ISIS. As the campaign to retake Mosul is ongoing, ISIS' organization, methods, and policies through the lens of the Clausewitzian Trinity (people, government and military) model are examined. A very important question to answer is: Is ISIS a state? At the risk of providing legitimacy to ISIS by acknowledging its status as a state, it is important to answer this question to better understand how to defeat it. If ISIS *is* a state, the application of the Clausewitzian Trinity model can provide useful tools to developing an effective whole of government strategy against it. This review suggests the relevance of this approach in combatting ISIS moving forward and highlights that the key to ISIS' survival has been its ability to assume the role of a state for disenfranchised Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria.

Background

ISIS originated in 1999 under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who established Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[5] Under Zarqawi, AQI executed several high-profile attacks that gained global notoriety. What first appeared to be typical, localized terrorist attacks, proved to be a larger plan by Zarqawi to draw the U.S. military and AQI into a protracted war; the ultimate goal being to end U.S. "imperialism" in the Middle East. The assumption by U.S. senior strategic leadership that the Arab community would

embrace a U.S. presence in the Middle East [following the Iraq invasion] proved grossly inaccurate. In reality, the U.S. presence in Iraq served as a catalyst to unite AQI. Ousting the Saddam Hussein regime and dismantling the Iraqi military had the unintended consequence of bolstering recruitment for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) united against a perceived U.S. occupation. AQI set out to defeat the U.S. in an Afghan-style war and create an Islamic Principality, or Emirate in Iraq.[6]

AQI achieved significant headway toward its goals by exploiting sectarian strife between Sunni populations and Shia leadership.[7] This served the dual purpose of undermining U.S. and partner legitimacy while increasing AQI recruitment. AQI's efforts were facilitated by the sectarian nature of the al-Maliki government. Following the Anbar Awakening, and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. "surge" forces, al-Maliki reneged on most of the assurances made to the Sunni populations for fair treatment in a new Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis found themselves increasingly abused and disenfranchised by the newly formed democratic and Shia-led government. Perceiving U.S. abandonment and betrayal by al-Maliki, many Sunnis subsequently looked to self-preservation and shifted their allegiance to the very insurgents they were fighting previously. This pattern of disenfranchisement became a recurring theme as AQI morphed into ISIS.

Zarqawi was killed in 2006 during a U.S. bombing mission, but AQI did not fall apart. His successor, Abu Omar al-Bagdadi, was killed in 2010; giving rise to a new leader,

Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, who expanded the Islamist fight into Syria.[8] Syria was already embroiled in civil war between Shia and Sunni elements of the population; thus ripe for ISIS. In Syria, ISIS continued to train, recruit, and strengthen the organization.

Today ISIS enjoys a highly sophisticated level of organization, complete with ministers to perform government functions.[9] ISIS has recruited former Iraqi military service members, leveraging their experience and professional expertise. It has used social media to recruit record numbers worldwide. ISIS also organized to finance and resource its claimed territories, solidifying their governance in parts of Iraq and Syria. Using revenue from oil fields in ISIS controlled areas and proceeds from the sale of antiquities, it has accumulated assets rivaling the GDP of many smaller nations.[10] Is ISIS a state? Assessing it against the Clausewitzian Trinity model will provide the answer.

Clausewitzian Trinity as a Model to Study ISIS

In *On War*, Clausewitz presents three invariable characteristics to the nature of war: (1) violence, hatred and animosity, (2) probability and chance, and (3) reason.[11]

> *"War is, therefore, not only a true chameleon, because it changes its nature in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original **violence** of its elements, **hatred and animosity**, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the*

*play of **probabilities and chance**, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to **reason.**"*

While these characteristics persist, their degree and intensity vary by means of the agents that Clausewitz chose to represent the *wonderful trinity of war* (people, army and government).

*"The first (**violence, hatred and animosity**) of these three phases concerns more the **people**; the second (**probabilities and chance**) more the general and his **army**; the third (**reason**) more the **Government**..."[12]*

The consistently changing world requires strategists who can adapt to provide plans that not only ensure the right wars are fought, but that they are fought effectively. Clausewitz provided a means for framing a war by examining the changing nature of these agents. Once it is clear where along the spectrum a conflict lies, as well as the relationships among those agents, it becomes possible for the strategist to identify the adversary's motivations (ends) and tailor ways and means for their defeat. By demonstrating how all of the agents are used to show the Trinity exist within ISIS, it becomes possible to understand how Clausewitz' model may be applied (See Figure 1).[13]

Figure 1.

People

Clausewitz often used the words people, community and nation interchangeably (Figure 1). In most cases he seemed to refer to a larger community or nation when he *mentioned "character of the people or state.[14]* Therefore, it is also reasonable to substitute the word nation in place of people. From here it is necessary to describe the characteristics of a nation, and establish whether or not members of ISIS share those traits.

A state has four distinguishing features that uniquely define it: population, territory, government and sovereignty.[15] Contrary to the state, whose population may consist of several ethnicities, a nation is a group of people sharing the same ethnic background. That is, a nation shares a common culture, religion and language. While a state must have a territory with defined borders, a nation may spread across states. An example is the Kurdish nation, which extends across Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.[16] Another example is ISIS, which has now expanded across Iraq,

Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Russia.[17]

Sovereignty is the one factor that delineates a state from a nation. While a nation can exist with or without a state, a state cannot exist without sovereignty. An example of a nation with a state is Quebec; under the sovereignty of Canada.[18] The Kurdish Nation and the Nation of Islam are illustrations of nations without states and which spread over more than one country.[19] Sovereignty is the feature that enables a state to enter into agreements, pacts and covenants with other states. The nature of sovereignty is also the one aspect that makes a nation more enduring than a state, especially when the nation no longer identifies with the state that is supposed to represent them.[20]

In order for the people who make up ISIS to be categorized as a nation they have to share common ethnicity (culture, religion, language). The Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition has defined culture as:

> *"The shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization. These shared patterns identify the members of a culture group while also distinguishing those of another group."*[21]

The day-to-day living habits, style of dress, dietary practices, religious rituals, gender roles, and relationships between men and women in the aggregate reveal a common culture that distinguishes ISIS members from other groups.

ISIS members are Sunni fundamentalist that share the same ideological branch of Wahhabism. Doctrinally, they strictly adhere to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and reject philosophies of more liberal Muslims. They believe strongly that religion plays a prominent role across the spectrum of life—private, public and political. This includes the application of Sharia as the law of the people under the governance of a caliphate. Given that the official language of Iraqi and Syrian Muslims is Arabic it is reasonable to assert that the majority of ISIS' members speak Arabic; thus having a common language. However, it should be pointed out that worldwide there are 1.57 billion Muslims spread across 200 countries with approximately 90 percent being Sunni.[22] Some of these non-Arabic speaking recruits serve ISIS as foreign fighters.

When the Ottoman Empire fell in 1922, the first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, abolished the last Sunni caliphate that had been in existence for five hundred years. Restoring the caliphate has been a zealous ambition of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and ISIS.[23] Furthermore, ISIS believes they have been blessed by God and will reestablish the caliphate globally.[24] It is evident that members of ISIS share a culture, religion, and language that readily distinguishes them as a nation. Moreover they identify with, and are bonded by, their collective desire for a global caliphate. Thus, ISIS satisfies the "people" criteria of the Clausewitzian Trinity.

Military

The purpose of a military is to defend the sovereignty of the state, protect the citizens, and compel an adversary to submit to the government's will. The military employs armed forces providing the means to conduct war. War is not the ends, but rather the ways for achieving the national interests of a country.[25] Clausewitz asserted that *"war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."*[26]

The aim of a military is to achieve the political purposes of the government. This requires a competent and skilled commander who is able to control his forces. Clausewitz emphasized this when he wrote, "A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing neither too much nor too little."[27] The commander's success in battle is also contingent on having a professional, disciplined and unified military force.[28]

Clausewitz believed strongly that the government should be the authority for establishing state policy, and should control the military. He also believed that government should determine how large its military should be. Furthermore, he considered it the responsibility of government to resource the military.[29]

To substantiate whether or not ISIS has a legitimate military as defined above, several questions need to be answered. As a starting point, analysts should ask if ISIS has:

- A military subordinate to civilian leadership?
- Civilian leadership able to direct/control its armed forces?
- A military strategy?
- A professional armed force?
- Weaponry and resources needed to conduct war and sustain a military force long-term?
- The ability to use its armed forces as a political instrument?
- Armed forces capable of seizing/holding territory?
- A record of success in combat?
- Members in its armed forces that have committed war crimes?

A thoughtful analysis will help strategists develop plans to permanently defeat ISIS' military. ISIS is led by a civilian-soldier, Baghdadi, with a loyal following of Sunni soldiers. However, ISIS governance seems to lie somewhere between an illegitimate caliphate and a military junta led by an authoritarian. This is likely not the civilian-led military Clausewitz envisioned. Left unchecked, this could be a vulnerability for ISIS, especially if the armed forces are used against other Sunni Muslims in a way that violates Islamic law.

ISIS does have a calculated military strategy that aligns with its overall goal of establishing a global caliphate.[30] The basic lines of effort of this strategy are to:

- Cultivate a professional officer corps.
- Develop a capable armed force.
- Provoke Shia to commit atrocities against Sunni; thereby motivating Sunnis to unite.
- Attrite military opponents' capabilities and morale.

A deliberate effort to analyze how aligned ISIS' principle goals are with its military strategy may prove beneficial in identifying strategies to defeat ISIS.

ISIS has a fighting force of approximately 30,000 soldiers, with about 90 percent from Arab countries and 10 percent from Western countries.[31,32] ISIS has managed to enlist over a thousand mid-to senior level commanders with considerable combat experience. Moreover, Baghdadi's deputies were ousted senior officers in the Iraqi military.[33] ISIS has accrued a substantial cache of weapons with a significant portion being U.S. weapons abandoned by the Iraqi army as well as other weapons captured during fighting in Iraq and Syria.[34]

ISIS has a functioning and capable military and its leadership is subordinate to a civilian authority. ISIS is utilizing its military to achieve political goals and its military has a strategy aligned with those political goals. Its military leadership and forces are competent, experienced, well equipped and financed, and have a proven track record. The military arm of ISIS satisfies the "military" criteria of the Clausewitzian Trinity model.

Government

Clausewitz asserted the role of government is protecting its sovereignty while meeting the needs and welfare of the people. According to Thomas B. Hartman, governments consist of people who establish, administer and enforce policy, and preside over and protect the sovereignty of their country.[35] He further stated the five functions of government are to: (1) provide national defense, (2) maintain domestic security, (3) administer economic policy, (4) deliver essential services, and (5) provide for the social welfare.[36]

By having a strong military a government is able to protect both the sovereignty of the state and the nation. Through a legal system that includes politicians to establish laws and regulations, a police to enforce its laws and deter crime, and a military to quell insurgencies, governments are able to maintain civil order and protect their people. Governments generate revenue by setting fiscal policy, collecting taxes, printing and coining money, and regulating international trade policy, which enables financing of military and police forces, public works projects, and social welfare programs.

Another crucial function of government is to provide essential services, such as affordable food, clean water, and sanitation systems. If such vital resources are restricted or unavailable the people will suffer and may turn against the government. In addition to essential services a state's population often relies on the social welfare provided by the government, such as public education, healthcare, disease prevention, roads, transportation, and public broadcast systems.

Depending on the type of government and character of its leaders, resources and services may or may not be equitably distributed. This unequal distribution is because what matters to the state is control of power and legitimacy. It relies on a loyal, law abiding populace. What matters most to the people is that they have security, essential services, and an economy that enables them to earn a living. If these needs are not met, or if government abuses its authority, the people may rebel.

"On June 29, 2014, (days after taking control of Mosul, Iraq)…ISIS spokesman…Abu Muhammad al-Adnani announced the restoration of the caliphate under the leadership of…Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Adnani declared the group would henceforth be known as the Islamic State (IS) and Baghdadi as "Caliph Ibrahim."[37] ISIS had brazenly announced to the international community that they had established a unified federal Islamic government for the Muslim world. But is their proclamation credible?

By the time ISIS had taken control of Mosul, ISIS managed to steal over two billion dollars (USD) giving it assets on par with many small nations, and making it arguably the wealthiest non-state terrorist group in the world.[38] By 2016 ISIS' military forces had succeeded in capturing 56,400 square miles of territory. This success, coupled with effective information operations, enabled ISIS to expand its influence and gain legitimacy among Sunni Muslims; even while facing international condemnation for its atrocities. Unlike prior VEOs, ISIS has seized tremendous power and territory in a very short period of time. The question now is will ISIS be able to secure the borders of the land it has captured? If so, will it have the resources needed to continue carrying out the governing functions of a sovereign state?

By virtue of its military triumphs alone, one might argue that ISIS' military is able to provide for its own "national" defense. "Domestic" security has been enabled by a robust system of territorial rules and practices under Sharia Law and enforced by security forces. Furthermore, ISIS has accrued significant revenue sources from oil, gas, agriculture, cotton, water, and electricity that enable it to support a robust economic policy—including provision of essential services and social welfare to ISIS members.[39] With such resources, ISIS provides the key functions expected of a government and therefore satisfies the "government" criteria of the Clausewitzian Trinity.

ISIS has met the criteria of statehood under the three arms of the Clausewitzian Trinity model. If one chooses to accept ISIS as a "state" as outlined here, the next question is how does the U.S. apply this understanding to deal with ISIS in the future?

Combatting ISIS

In 2006, tribes in Iraq's Anbar Province turned against an AQI led insurgency. This "Awakening" worked for a time because it lacked a sectarian perspective (Sunni tribes fought Sunni insurgents) and was initially endorsed by the Shia-dominated government. The synergy between people, military, and government legitimized the effort. Although undone in 2009 as al-Maliki took a sectarian path, the effort demonstrated possibilities for undermining ISIS in future operations.[40]

In 2014, the U.S. had few options in responding to the rapid advance of ISIS in northern Iraq and the surge was over. A key element of U.S. strategy to train and equip Iraqis to fight for themselves faltered as security forces dissolved amid ISIS advances. Sunni partners from the Awakening period no longer trusted the U.S. or the Shia-dominated Iraqi government as many Sunnis joined ISIS. Further

aggravating sectarian tensions, the only forces truly capable of engaging ISIS were the Iranian-backed, Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).[41] In this environment, ISIS seized on the opportunity and assumed the role of Sunni protector. As Charles Lister notes:

> *"Since its first days of operational existence in Iraq in 2003...IS has sought to engender and exploit chaos by rupturing foundational social fabrics, especially inter-sectarian trust and cooperation. The preeminent role of a largely Shia force [PMUs] – whose leaders include commanders designated as international terrorists by the U.S. government—in combating a Sunni extremist organization on Sunni territory is unlikely to heal existing societal rifts or to defeat the sectarian dynamics that IS has encouraged and fed off in Iraq for so many years."[42]*

ISIS' successes in Iraq coincided with dramatic gains in Syria and with equally dramatic human consequences. The theme of damaged and dysfunctional relations between a government and its people were repeated. Weis and Hassan assert that sectarianism long predated the current conflict and is key to understanding the failure of U.S. and coalition attempts to defeat ISIS. There are clear indicators that the al-Assad government not only failed to address the interests of a majority Sunni population, but instead has encouraged sectarian tensions to solidify his regime's power and legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.[43] "This sectarianism was carefully manufactured by Assad from the get-go as a tool of his suppression," stated Shiraz Maher, an expert on radicalization at King's College London.

> *"This was the original line, and it tried to do two things. First, peel off the rest of Syria from the Sunnis who were rebelling so that Alawite or Christian dissidents wouldn't join the uprising...Second, provoke concern in the international community about what is taking place—namely, the minorities [Alawites] were all going to be slaughtered by terrorists [Sunni population]."[44]*

Against such a background, it is extremely difficult to imagine a future Syria where al-Assad's leadership will be viewed as legitimate by the majority Sunni population. Lister argues the key to ISIS's defeat in Syria ultimately rests with the predominantly Sunni insurgency as the only recognized legitimate resistance. As with the Sunni Awakening, this effort saw gains against ISIS in 2013 and 2014 in areas such as western Aleppo. The effort has been stymied, however, due to simultaneous pressures on the insurgents to fight the Syrian regime that is heavily supported by Iran. Exacerbating this challenge is the U.S.'s unreliability as a partner as it struggles to determine which insurgents to back, and given prior links between many "moderate" Sunni insurgents and terrorists' organizations.[45]

Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria have at times been poised to deliver decisive blows to ISIS. However, tensions between Kurdish forces and Sunni militias, coupled with the larger

competition between Kurdish militias and the Turkish government, limit possibilities.[46]

Conclusions

U.S. and partner efforts against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria have been hindered by a fundamental disconnect between the people and central governments and the people and militaries. In the parlance of the Clausewitzian Trinity, ISIS has effectively filled the gaps by becoming the state for many disenfranchised Sunni populations. Lister asserts the driving force behind ISIS' survival has not been embracement of their extreme ideology by affected populations, but rather:

> *"In both Syria and Iraq, IS presents itself as both an army and an alternative "state" to defend against and replace repressive or failed political systems perceived as oppressive to Sunni Muslims...it has been this socio-politically focused image that has been most effective at securing IS the kind of roots into sectors of society that provide the potential for long-term survival."[47]*

This view suggests that direct U.S. and partner military actions and attempts at counter-narratives can only go so far until the underlying roots of grievances that help legitimize ISIS' role as a functioning state are addressed. U.S. actions in Mosul and beyond must strive to undermine this key pillar of ISIS' strength by bolstering the legitimacy of affected governments in the eyes of their people. In practical terms this means America must sustain pressure on Iraqi leadership to include Sunni elements in power sharing, governance and military ventures. Supportive of this effort, there is a need to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed forces in Iraq. A way ahead in Syria along these lines may be untenable without regime change.

ISIS has survived thus far by understanding the principles Clausewitz laid down as well or better than the U.S. and coalition partners have. It has established a government, a robust military, and people over which it governs—meeting the criteria of the Clausewitzian Trinity. In the future, application of the Clausewitzian model can help provide a useful framework for analyzing strengths and vulnerabilities while informing more effective, whole-of-government approaches to turning the tide against ISIS and similar extremists groups.

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Truthfulness, Trust, and the Practice of Military Deception

by

LTC John W. Bauer, Ph.D.

The U.S. military has a practical interest in the virtue of truthfulness, one of the character traits contributing directly to trust. Virtues, according to Aristotle, are moral excellences, a reflection of socially-praised patterns of praiseworthy behavior. In other words, the virtues are the names we give for good moral habits. Virtues are inherently opposed to vicious acts, acts that are morally impermissible and that, because of our human tendency to habituate our actions, often develop into vices. The vicious acts that are always contrary to the virtue of truthfulness are lying and perfidy, both of which have the potential to be used instrumentally to accomplish military deception. If lying and perfidy are inherently un-virtuous, then it seems that such acts must always be avoided, even toward one's enemies in war.

At the same time, military doctrine emphasizes the fundamental need to deceive one's enemies in war. This is because successful military strategy lends itself to the concealment of intentions, misdirection, and other forms of deception. For this reason, military commanders regularly employ feints and simulated attacks to hide their actual intentions from their adversary, use camouflage and other techniques to mask their true location, or engage in concealment and surprise to ambush unsuspecting foes. Some might suggest that these tactics generate false beliefs, and, like lies, are necessarily in conflict with the virtue of truthfulness. Can these two ideas–military deception and truthfulness–seemingly in conflict with each other, be reconciled?

This essay suggests that it is not only possible to reconcile the two, but that they *should* be reconciled, and that this can be done in a systematic and principled way. Otherwise, the fundamental values of our profession risk being inconsistent. Part of this entails a strict adherence to the rules against lying and perfidy, rules reflected, to some extent, in the international law of war. It also requires a coherent understanding of what constitutes a lie, which is conceptually equivalent to perfidy, since both lies and perfidy are at their very essence acts of bad faith.

Truthfulness and the Rule Against Lying and Perfidy

One major reason the U.S. military values the virtue of truthfulness as both a moral excellence and a habit of desirable behavior is because truthfulness builds trust. If a country does not trust its military or if professionals within a military organization do not trust each other, the institution itself risks being dysfunctional. Without trust, a citizenry is likely to doubt whether its military will properly and reliably defend them; without trust, the necessary elements that underlie an effective fighting force, such as unit cohesion, obedience to orders, the willingness to make personal sacrifice, risk being imperiled.

For this reason, trust and the need to build trust is not only emphasized in current U.S. military doctrine, it has been placed center-stage. Army doctrine refers to trust as the 'bedrock' of the Army profession, and joint doctrine goes so far as to suggest that 'trust' is the principal reason why military professionals should act ethically and morally.[1] Following this thinking, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey argues that military professionals must uphold the values that underpin our profession *for the sake of building trust*.[2] These values are the 'joint values' of the Armed Forces of the United States: duty, honor, courage, integrity, and selfless service. Two of these (honor and integrity) directly relate to truthfulness.[3]

The relationship between honor and integrity as values and truthfulness as a virtue is woven into the etymology of the two former terms. Honor takes its roots from the Latin term *honos*, which in the classical sense conveyed a sense of *moral respectability*. This is evident in the meaning of its adjective derivative, *honestus*, a word used to describe those who are morally upright, respected, or *honest*. It is from this term that the English words honest and honesty originate–an origin suggesting the ancients believed truthfulness served as the foundation for all honorable conduct and, in turn, all morally respectable behavior.

Similar to honor, integrity also suggests strict adherence to a set of moral principles. One of these principles, because of its inseparable connection to moral

respectability in general, is truthfulness. Taken from the Latin *integer*, meaning whole or one, the term integrity implies moral whole-ness. When communication and agreements are involved, this wholeness is achieved by being singular in both thought and word rather than duplicitously asserting one thing yet believing or intending another. This connection between integrity, oneness, and purity is important to note because the essence of lying is to act in a way that is 'double' rather than as a unified, integrated whole. Lying, most fundamentally, is false assertion–an assertion contrary to what the speaker thinks or believes to be true. Such expressions are opposed to integrity, just as they are contrary to honor. For this reason, joint doctrine includes in its description of honor the imperative "never to lie, cheat, or steal."[4]

Honor and integrity are also related to one another through the Latin notion of *fides* (faith), the foundational idea that underlies the ancient vocabulary of agreement. *Fides*, most fundamentally, expresses the idea that what is promised will be fulfilled. Translated into English as both faith and trust, *fides* has two implicit moral requirements. The first obliges honesty while making agreements (either explicit or tacit), a requirement to always act in 'good faith' – 'good,' because the promiser is truthful and genuine in expressing those parts of the agreement he intends to fulfill. Hence, this first imperative demands truthfulness in each agreement as it is made (in the moment).

The second moral requirement inherent in *fides* stems from the expectation that a promise will be fulfilled, an expectation about the future. This expectation has more to do with the promisor's reliability and capability to carry out the promise than it does with truth. From this expectation, the duty or obligation to fulfill promises receives its moral force. Because there is an expectation that those who promise will deliver on what they have pledged, there is a universal belief that those who make promises *should* do what they say they will do, given that the promise is reasonable and that the promisor has the requisite ability (i.e. 'ought' implies 'can').

While both moral requirements relate to honor and integrity, the imperative 'always act in good faith' is the one that has a direct connection to truthfulness. Truthfulness, as a virtue necessarily entwined in honor and integrity, requires, at a minimum, that a U.S. military professional never enter into or affirm an agreement insincerely or duplicitously. Because this expectation of truthfulness is not only held, but also enforced as a norm of behavior throughout the military, a general trust is developed, nurtured, and maintained. This is a trust not only between individuals, but an overall trust in the U.S. military as an institution and, perhaps, a trust that even extends to all human beings, especially with regards to promises and agreements. In contrast, if a U.S. military professional, each of whom has made a tacit agreement to live by the joint values, demonstrates dishonesty, not only does this damage trust in that individual, but it also tends to cause people,

institutions, and even humanity in general to be held increasingly suspect.[5]

The need for a basic trust in one's comrades-in-arms, co-workers, fellow citizens, and even one's enemies, a trust that involves a belief in the sincerity of agreements and promises, is the fundamental idea behind the prohibition of perfidy in both joint doctrine and the international law of armed conflict. According to joint doctrine, illicit deceptive acts fall under the title of perfidy (i.e. false invitations to trust, or acts of bad faith). An example of perfidy is presenting a false white flag or flag of truce to launch a surprise attack.[6] While international law only explicitly prohibits false invitations to trust that take advantage of an enemy's willingness to abide by the law of armed conflict (thus making perfidious acts those stratagems that undermine the law itself), the spirit of the rule condemns *all false invitations to trust*. The reason this is the case is that every false invitation to trust involves entering into an agreement, oftentimes unspoken or implicit, in bad faith–therefore each instance of perfidy is, essentially, a lying promise. False invitations to trust constitute an act of bad faith, which can jeopardize future formal agreements between belligerents and even the cessation of hostilities, since the trust underlying the very ability to make agreements, such as those treaties that bring about the end of a conflict, risks being destroyed.

Every act of perfidy, like the false white flag, extends a false invitation to trust; perfidy is, essentially, an attempt to establish

the requisite trust (a tacit agreement) so that a promise will be believed (e.g. that I wish to surrender), a promise that what is being communicated is sincere or genuine, when, in fact, the promise is false. Each lie does essentially the same. In a lie, the liar attempts to establish trust by communicating in the assertive context (thereby making a tacit agreement), but he does so falsely (i.e. in bad faith). In a lie, the invitation to trust is duplicitous and insincere, since the liar makes an assertion contrary to what he believes to be true. When used instrumentally to achieve military deception, both perfidy, and presumably all direct attempts to lie to one's enemy, make those perfidious deceptions not only morally flawed, since they are contrary to truthfulness, but also illegal, since they violate the prohibition of perfidy expressed in international law.

Clausewitz and Permissible Deception

While international law and the rule against perfidy make clear what kinds of deception should be avoided, it is also worthwhile to characterize how military deception can be properly implemented. Clausewitz, perhaps to the surprise of some (because of the moral content of the subject), provides a good starting point.[7] It should be noted that Clausewitz, while by no means an enthusiastic supporter of elaborate deceptions,[8] nevertheless addresses the issue of bad faith and military deception and, in doing so, echoes the prohibition of bad faith while recommending the proper way to use deception in war. In the introduction to his chapter on military deception (where he uses

the German word *list*, meaning cunning or stratagem), he says:

> The term "cunning" [*list*] implies secret purpose. It contrasts with the straightforward, simple, direct approach much as wit contrasts with direct proof. Consequently, it has nothing in common with methods of persuasion, of self-interest, or of force, but a great deal with deceit, which also conceals its purpose. It is itself a form of deceit, when it is completed; yet not deceit in the ordinary sense of the word, since no outright breach of faith is involved. The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before his very eyes.[9]

Here, Clausewitz is careful to distinguish between deceptions that involve breach of faith (i.e. an act of bad faith) and what he calls "cunning." Bad faith, he suggests, is not a proper use of deception, because this kind of deceit intends deception while at the same time inviting trust. Instead, he suggests that cunning, properly conceived, involves the concealment of one's true intentions ("secret purpose") while allowing the enemy to make his own mistakes. Because the enemy is always seeking to uncover one's plans, provided one's purposes are successfully hidden, the enemy may be tricked into misjudgment, which, in turn, places the enemy at a disadvantage.

If Clausewitz is correct, the proper application of military deception need not and should not involve acts of bad faith. In fact, of the four techniques named in U.S. military doctrine – feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays–none require, in and of themselves, bad faith. This is because the essence of stratagem, the use of misdirection and the concealment of one's intentions, involves luring or trapping one's enemy. As Liddell Hart explains, this causes one's enemy, ideally, to make a false move "so that, as in ju-jitsu, his own effort is turned into the level of his overthrow."[10]

An example from recent military history helps illustrate military deception entirely devoid of any invitation to trust extended toward the enemy. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States military devised and led a deception operation that occurred when coalition forces first began their offensive against Iraqi forces. In that conflict, the war plan sought "to deceive Iraqi forces regarding Coalition intentions and to conceal the Coalition scheme of maneuver."[11] One way coalition forces sought to accomplish this was by using decoy military equipment, such as inflatable helicopters. Another method used was to array coalition ground forces in a way that gave the appearance that the main attack would come directly across the border from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait.

This false picture was painted just prior to the initiation of hostilities. Shortly after the air campaign began, coalition aircraft succeeded in destroying the Iraqi air force,

thereby removing Saddam Hussein's ability to detect further coalition troop movements. This allowed the coalition force commander, General Schwarzkopf, to reposition his forces hundreds of miles to the west and attack into Iraq instead of Kuwait. The deception left American tanks free to enter Iraq and strike Saddam's reserve divisions, his elite Republican Guard, from a direction and at a time they were least expecting.[12]

This example of permissible deception, one that avoided false invitations to trust, illustrates the use of display (simulations and disguises to cause an enemy to misinterpret the true disposition of one's own forces) to mislead the Iraqi Army in a way that nonetheless preserves faith. In Army doctrine, the requirement to act in good faith is embedded in a single underlying principle for what constitutes a permissible stratagem, which is expressed in the following way: "In general, a belligerent may resort to those measures for mystifying or misleading the enemy against which the enemy ought to take measures to protect himself."[13] Applying this principle, it concludes, "It would be an improper practice to secure an advantage of the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading conduct which involves a breach of faith."[14] In other words, belligerents should expect to be deceived by their adversaries, but under situations when a direct invitation to trust is being extended, it is morally impermissible, unjust, and, in turn, unlawful to deceive one's enemy.

Conclusion

Truthfulness is considered a moral excellence in the military profession because it is directly related to *fides*, the confidence members of a society or institution have in the moral fabric underlying all promises and agreements. Lying is contrary to *fides* because with every lie a false invitation to trust is being made–an insincere tacit agreement, as it were, that the words asserted are believed true. The false invitation to trust is also the essence of perfidy, an act of bad faith occurring when one party to an agreement makes a lying promise. In this way, the virtue of truthfulness contains two prohibitions: the rule against lying and the rule against perfidy.

Despite the fact that this inherently restrictive moral requirement is always in place, it is nonetheless worthwhile to point out that opportunities to communicate directly with one's enemy in war and extend an offer of mutual trust are extremely limited, and when such opportunities afford themselves to belligerents, acts of bad faith are generally avoided out of prudence – that is, to preserve the ability to make future treaties, truces, and the like. If an enemy is lawfully deceived, it is usually the result of poor or faulty inferences; the desire to gain an advantage leads an enemy to guess his opponent's intentions and designs and to guess wrongly. Helping one's enemy make these erroneous inferences is part of the art of generalship, the essence of strategy. Yet to accomplish this, a military professional need not sacrifice his honor; it is not only possible that he remain truthful, it is necessary, morally speaking. This conclusion, in turn, gives credence to the absolute principle suggested both in doctrine and in international law: to mislead one's enemy and be victorious in the practice of waging just war, a military professional need not and should not lie.

Author Biography

Lieutenant Colonel John Bauer is an Army strategist assigned to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of South Carolina, and his research interests include Just War theory and the ethics of lying and deception. His previous assignments include teaching Philosophy at the United States Military Academy and serving as a strategic planner for Special Operations Command Korea.

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[1] See for example Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington D.C., September 2012), 2-1 and Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C., March, 2013), B-2. (Henceforth JP 1.)

[2] Martin Dempsey, "America's Military – A Profession of Arms White Paper," 2012.

[3] JP 1, B-2.

[4] Ibid.

[5] This idea is a common theme in the Just War Tradition. Augustine, for example, says that when *fides* becomes damaged, it leaves "every brother appear suspect to every brother." Augustine, *Contra Mendacium*, 4 (PL 40). Aristotle makes a similar claim in his *Rhetoric*, where he says that if good faith has been taken away, "human intercourse ceases to exist." Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.15 1376b 14. This reading of Aristotle comes from Grotius, referred to by many as the 'father' of international law. See Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (The Law of War and Peace), trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1925), III.25.1, 860.

[6] International Red Cross, Customary Law. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul. Accessed 4 June 2015.

[7] His famous dictum "War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force" is sometimes understood to mean that all manner of violence should be used as a means to bring about a war's end. For this reason, some have criticized Clausewitz for suggesting that ethical considerations and moral restraint has no place in war. See for example B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Meridian, 1967), 343.

[8] Clausewitz suggests that the fog and friction of war tend to make the careful and meticulous implementation of traps and trickery all but unrealistic. Downplaying the efficacy of military deception, Clausewitz remarks, "Yet however one longs to see opposing generals vie with one another in craft, cleverness, and cunning, the fact remains that these qualities do not figure prominently in the history of war. Rarely do they stand the welter of events and circumstances." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 202.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Hart, 146.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress* (Washington D.C., 1992), 102.

[12] H. Norman Schwarzkopf, "Central Command Briefing," *Military Review* (September 1991): 97.

[13] FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, sect. 49.

[14] Ibid., sect. 50.

Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War to Peace Through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: Understanding the Relevant Literature

by

Thomas J. Snukis

This essay is the second in a series of essays that focuses on the transition from war to peace through stabilization, reconstruction, and development. The first essay concentrated on identifying the essential U.S. governmental strategic guidance, concepts, and doctrine surrounding stabilization, reconstruction, and development and can be found in the Campaigning Fall 2016 edition. This second essay examines several relevant books on the subject and highlights areas that the U.S. national security policymaker, diplomat, Joint warfighter and other governmental agencies must account for as they seek to understand an emerging post-intervention environment. Future essays in the series will examine lessons from history, including the lessons from OIF and OEF, through an operational lens in an attempt to further the understanding of the U.S. national security apparatus, and conclude with an assessment and recommendations for the future.

RELEVANT LITERATURE

There is a wealth of literature regarding the study of conflict, stabilization, reconstruction, and development. To gain a deeper understanding of the intricacies and issues faced by military, diplomatic, and developmental practitioners, we reviewed and studied a variety of literature on the subject. Only scratching the surface with our basic review, these documents still provide a deeper contextual understanding of conflict, stabilization, reconstruction, and development to the national security policymaker and practitioner and must be understood to better design, plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations of this nature. We identified the documents below as very useful references for the U.S. national security professional.

After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, Janet A McDonnell, Department of the Army, 1999.

This study provides excellent insight into an example of effective stability and reconstruction. The Kuwaiti model underscores the importance of host nation involvement, the utility of prior planning, and numerous other valuable lessons. Concise and easy to read, this book identifies several critical variables that the Kuwaiti planning team, along with the U.S. advisors, emphasized. For instance, they organized their effort into ten teams to handle the post-Desert Storm missions of stabilization and reconstruction. Those teams focused on the following:

- Communication
- Transportation
- Education

- Health and Food
- Airports and Ports
- Electricity and water
- Oil
- Public works
- Information
- Legal and political system.[1]

A critical factor in the success of this effort was the primacy of the affected nation (Kuwait) in driving the stabilization and reconstruction process; however, without U.S. assistance "the people of Kuwait would suffer tremendous physical and economic hardship that could lead to further unrest in the region… U.S. officials realized that winning the war was not enough; they must also secure the peace." [2] Because of the specific situation in Kuwait (pre-conflict security governance, economy, rule of law and social well-being were extremely effective), once the Iraqis were ejected from the country, the Kuwaiti law enforcement and internal security apparatus quickly regained civil control and civil order (with minimal U.S. troop assistance). Where the U.S. did provide extensive support was in the engineering domain. "Based on …priorities and preliminary damage assessments, [U.S.] soldiers quickly repaired essential facilities and functions…to meet the immediate health, safety, and security needs of the Kuwaiti people." A vital positive consequence of the U.S. activity was the impact their actions had on the Kuwaiti people. "Task Force Freedom focused its attention on repairing Kuwait's infrastructure particularly its electrical

grid…. Restoring power had a profound psychological, as well as physical impact on the well-being of the Kuwaiti people."[3]

***Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World,* Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Oxford University Press, 2008.**

This is an extremely informative book written by the current President of Afghanistan and the Director for the Institute of State Effectiveness. Most useful is the proposed framework that outlines the ten functions of the state. Those functions as laid out by Ghani and Lockhart are:

- Rule of law
- A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence
- Administrative control
- Sound management of public finances
- Investments in human capital
- Creation of citizenship rights through social policy
- Provision of infrastructure services
- Formation of a market
- Management of public assets
- Effective public borrowing.[4]

***Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009.**

The framework described in U.S. Institute of Peace's publication entitled *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,* lays out five broad

categories labeled as end states. To achieve post-conflict stability, begin reconstruction, and set the conditions for longer-term development the end-states must be addressed and ultimately achieved to some culturally accepted standard. Listed and defined below are the five end states:

- **Safe and Secure Environment:** The ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systemic or large-scale violence.
- **Rule of Law:** The ability of the people to have access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.
- **Stable Governance**: The ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.
- **Sustainable Economy:** The ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within the system of economic governance bound by law.
- **Social Well-Being:** The ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.[5]

These end-states can serve as ready-made lines of operation for U.S. National Security professionals and must be understood so as to inform postwar planning.

***Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience,* Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction, 2009.**

This publication is extremely descriptive and chronicles the 'hard lessons' from the stabilization and reconstruction operations conducted after the Iraq regime was toppled during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 'hard lessons' are relatively not a good news story; however, they detail numerous practical examples of what worked and what didn't work during the operation. The examples are rich in detail and illustrate the compelling prerequisites of securing the people and restoring their well-being before any of the other end-states are achieved.

Jay Garner the director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) during Operation Enduring Freedom clearly understood the priorities and sequencing requirements for security and social well-being fairly as evidenced in the eleven ORHA goals he established. Those eleven goals are:

- Security
- Salaries Paid Nationwide
- Return Police to Work and Train Them
- Return Ministries to a Functional Level
- Restore Basic Services to Baghdad
- Prevent a Fuel Crisis
- Purchase Crops
- Solve Food Distribution Challenges

- Install Town Councils Nationwide
- Deploy and Integrate Government Support Teams with Local Government
- Prevent Cholera and Dysentery [6]

***The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, Paul Collier, Oxford University Press, 2007.**

Collier, an economist, identifies and examines four traps that the poorest countries find themselves caught in. He labels them the **'conflict trap'**, the **'natural resources trap'**, the **'trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors'**, and the **'trap of bad governance in a small country'**. His book appeals to the general population based on his straightforward approach. His content, though, certainly has utility for diplomatic, development, and military professionals.[7]

***The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley, Association of the United States Army, 2005.**

This book is filled with a wealth of practical information regarding stabilization, reconstruction, and longer-term development. The examples used throughout the book center around U.S. and international involvement in the Balkan conflict. The study identifies numerous key concepts and lines of action

that must be accounted for within a post-conflict environment. First, the authors identify the importance of transforming power within a post-conflict environment. They detail "the compelling necessity for managing down conflict among local factions." They further contend that this requires three sequential stages to develop. Those stages are:

- ***Stage 1: imposed stability/an unsustainable peace process***
- ***Stage 2: viable peace/a sustainable peace process***
- ***Stage 3: self-sustaining peace/a self-enforcing peace process***

Their explanation for each stage is extremely useful. These sequential stages strongly support our proposition that security and social well-being are the critical first steps towards achieving post-conflict stability and must be prioritized and sequenced above the other end states. This study claims it takes about three years to achieve *Stage 1* objectives before moving to *Stage 2*. Regardless of the timing, they recognize substantively the need to sequence actions before attempting to accomplish the other end-states. Without security and social well-being, the other end-states lose importance. [8]

Another key item addressed by Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley is a concept termed 'temporizing strategy.' While this concept is critical for our understanding, it is imperative for national security decision-makers. The wide-ranging scope

of tasks within a post-conflict environment reveals areas that must be attended to at some point (*Stages 2 or 3*) but cannot be addressed until actions are first accomplished or pre-conditions established. Moreover, in some circumstances, to accomplish the task correctly, "the temporizing strategy would have to achieve several objectives, not all complementary." When you must 'temporize' an activity, higher-level national decision-makers get frustrated.[9]

Two excellent 'temporizing strategy' examples from Operation Enduring Freedom were the approach the military and diplomats implemented regarding the Afghan opium problem and Afghan warlords. Ultimately, both challenges required attention because of the long-term destabilizing nature of these practices and the fact that they are inconsistent with basic U.S. values. In the short term, however, both were required for immediate security purposes. If the coalition adopted an aggressive strategy towards the Afghan narcotics trade and warlord practices, they would have introduced a whole new set of destabilizing variables into an already complex Afghan security environment.

For many otherwise law abiding Afghan farmers, laborers, truck drivers, and other associated workers, the opium trade provided their only means of earning a living. With no viable alternatives in place, destroying or even just disrupting this economic source for a large number of Afghans would have most certainly

sparked even more unrest and violence. Fully understanding that disrupting the opium trade was not a viable practice for the long-term, the Coalition also understood that a 'temporizing strategy' of passive prevention was more acceptable in the short-term as conditions were established for longer-term progress.

Although warlords and their practices are not acceptable in a democracy, warlords were a key element in Afghan society and would need to be addressed with a longer-term strategy unless the Coalition wanted to fuel the already unstable environment. Many of the warlords were true patriots in the eyes of their people and factions. They had fought the Soviets and won. They had fought the Taliban and won. Now because they did not fit the future vision for Afghanistan from a U.S. perspective, they must be removed? Recognizing that the warlords were not part of a longer-term solution, Coalition leadership also understood that removing the warlords would spark additional conflict and instability. This was unacceptable as well. As a result, the Coalition adopted a 'temporizing strategy' regarding the warlords and planned for their inclusion into the legitimate fledgling Afghan governmental structure, in effect, co-opting the warlords. Most were given positions of importance and influence commensurate with the power they were giving up as warlords enabling them to retain their prestige and power. While not the ideal, it became a temporary solution and bought time until better government institutions and practices could be established and

allowed to grow.

***The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*. Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. London: Routledge. 2009.**

This book by Paris and Sisk is a must-read for the U.S. National Security policymaker and practitioner. It is filled with excellent insight and a wealth of information. For instance David Edelstein's chapter addresses the footprint and duration dilemma experienced by the U.S. government in both Iraq and Afghanistan.[10] Also addressed within this edited volume are concepts from Jeffery Herbst who offers an approach that addresses the issue in this way, "let states fail: allow new forms and centers of political authority to emerge through conflict and cooperation without outside direction or intrusion…redraw national boundaries to reflect these new arrangements, rather than seeking to perpetuate the untenable fictions of many existing states." [11] Correspondingly, Jeremy Weinstein introduces a strategy of "autonomous recovery" whereby states reach "a lasting peace, a systematic reduction in violence, and postwar political and economic development in the absence of international intervention." [12] Under further scrutiny and deeper analysis, the pros and cons of each approach emerge. Regardless if one or the other or a hybrid would work in a given circumstance, they must, at a minimum, be considered with other available

alternatives in a discourse contemplating the use of force or other extreme measures.

***Why Men Rebel,* Ted Robert Gurr, Princeton University Press, 1970.**

An adaptation of his doctoral dissertation,*The Genesis of Violence: A Multivariate Theory of Civil Strife,* Ted Gurr's book is a classic study of men and women and what causes them to use or threaten to use violence through revolution, rebellions, guerilla wars, coups, and riots. As Gurr suggests, it is written for rebels and rulers. "Rebels should read it, for I think it implies means for the attainment of human aspirations that are more effective and less destructive to themselves and others….The study will surely be read by men seeking means for the preservation of public order."[13]

This study directly connects with postconflict stability, reconstruction, and development as our series of essays seeks means and methods to restore public order after it has disintegrated, regardless of the causal factors. We most certainly can gain valuable insights into our subject by looking at Gurr's concepts. Gurr's analysis becomes even more valuable as we are interested in, as is Gurr, the mindset and attitude of the individuals and population residing in or returning to a post-conflict environment. From Gurr we gain better clarity on the primacy of securing the population and providing for their social well-being. Gurr highlights the essential nature of a safe and secure environment and the value of fully accounting for the needs of the people as he defines three key concepts and their

relationship: value expectations, value capabilities and relative deprivation. "Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled to." [14] Gurr defines value capabilities "as the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them." [15] He then develops the relationship between the two as relative deprivation which is " the perceived discrepency between men's value expectations and value capapabilities. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprevation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence….Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent."[16] It is obvious that a functional knowledge of Gurr's concepts is crucial in order to operate effectively in any environment but especially in a post-conflict environment.

As Gurr looks at relative deprivation as a catylyst for rebellion or revolt he further reveals that " Deprivation-induced discontent is a general spur to action."[17] It seems that the opposite would hold true as well. If you can remove or decrease the sense of relative deprivation you could induce a previously deprived population to positive action. This may not hold true but at a minimum, with the deprivation reduced or removed, a post-conflict population could in fact be neutral to the on-going changes within their environment until a balance or equilibrium was achieved in the post-conflict environment. Regardless, essential on both sides of the ledger as demonstrated by Gurr in his book, is the powerful role people play in the equation. [18]

In conclusion, many of the practical examples, theories and concepts presented in the above books hold value for the US national security professional in a postconflict environment. Developing an understanding of these examples and concepts will give the U.S. government better insight when faced with missions of this nature in the future. In the next article we will examine specific examples from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to inform the future.

Author Biography.

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[13] Gurr, Ted Robert. 2011. *Why men rebel*. Boulder, Colo: Paradigm Pub. x-xi.

[14] Ibid. 13.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. 13-192.

[18] Ibid.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Derived from a Subsystem Analysis of North Korea

by

MAJ Tyler J. Standish and LTC Edward D. Cuevas

Since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the de facto end to the Korean War in 1953, the United States' engagement policy with North Korea has gone through multiple evolutions. Previous attempts to influence North Korean behavior with the threat of force, diplomacy, economic sanctions, and informational campaigns have had limited impact. Through the use of hostile actions, and while under international sanctions, North Korea has been able to achieve surprising military gains; to the point where they are, in effect, a nuclear capable country with an extensive and growing ballistic missile program. Over the past five years, the United States has turned more frequently to demonstrations of military power, or a "Show of Force" coupled with harsher economic sanctions in an effort to change the behavior of North Korea and its leadership to alter its provocative behavior and abandon or cease its nuclear weapons program. However, increased demonstrations of military power and additional sanctions have not produced substantive change and may have actually contributed to North Korean provocations. The current U.S. policy toward North Korea of *Strategic Patience and Containment* has had limited success. To support this thesis, we have applied a series of foresight tools to facilitate our analysis used to inform our assessment. The tools used are causal loop diagram, force field analysis, futures wheels, implication trees, cross-impact analysis, and stress testing of our conclusions.

To understand the current U.S. policy with North Korea and to make policy recommendations, a short historical overview is necessary to provide the context of this relationship. The number of incidents which have occurred between the U.S. and North Korea and South Korea, and North Korea affecting U.S. policy toward North Korea are too numerous to list for this analysis. Therefore, the chronology below lists only the most significant incidents.

Chronology of U.S.-North Korea Inflection Points:

- June 25, 1950: North Korea invades South Korea starting the Korean War.
- July 27, 1953: Korean Armistice Agreement signed signaling de facto end to the Korean War.
- August 18, 1974: Axe Murder Incident at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); two U.S. officers killed; U.S. conducts large show-of-force.
- March 6, 1992-Present: Various economic sanctions imposed against North Korea. Sanctions are both multi-lateral (United Nations) and unilateral (U.S.) in nature.
- July 8, 1994: Kim Il Sung dies; his son Kim Jong Il takes power.
- October 21, 1994: Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed; key elements were being implemented until 2003 when U.S. assesses

that North Korea has continued its uranium enrichment program; each side blames the other for breakdown.

- August 27, 2003-April 5, 2009: Six-Party Talks; during this timeframe, the U.S. South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia conduct a series of meetings with the aim to find a peaceful resolution to security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program; many agreements are reached, but North Korea is continually found in breach of any agreement as it continues to develop and conduct tests of its nuclear capabilities.

- March 26, 2010: Republic of Korea (ROK) ship *Cheonan* sunk; investigation implicates North Korea.

- November 23, 2010: North Korea conducts artillery bombardment of ROK island Yeonpyeong resulting in four South Koreans killed and 19 injured.

- December 17, 2011: Kim Jong Il dies; his son Kim Jong Un takes power.

- February 29, 2012: U.S./North Korea "Leap Day Deal;" U.S. provides substantial food aid in return for North Korea agreeing to a moratorium on uranium enrichment and missile testing and a return of IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, leading to a resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

- April 6, 2012: North Korea attempts a rocket launch suspending the "Leap Day Deal."

- February 12, 2013: North Korea conducts nuclear test with estimated 6-7 kiloton yield.

- December 21, 2015: North Korea successfully launches a ballistic missile from a submarine.

- January 6, 2016: North Korea announces it conducted a fourth nuclear weapons test,

claiming to have detonated a hydrogen bomb; this claim is disputed by experts due to the low yield of the explosion.

- July 6, 2016: The US Department of Treasury announces designations on top North Korean officials, including the leader, Kim Jong Un, over ties to human rights abuses in North Korea.

- August 3, 2016: North Korea fires a medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong. The missile splashes down in Japan's economic exclusion zone, about 200 kilometers off Japan's coast.

- August 24, 2016: North Korea tests an SLBM, the KN-11. The missile ejects from a submarine and flies approximately 500 kilometers on a lofted trajectory before splashing down in the ocean. The test appears to be a success.

- September 9, 2016: North Korea conducts a fifth nuclear test. The seismic activity registers a magnitude of 5.0.

- October 19, 2016: North Korea conducts a failed test of what is believed to be the intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile. The missile explodes shortly after lift-off. This is the eighth test of the Musudan in 2016. Only the June launch was a success.

North Korea As a System

A system is an interconnected set of elements organized in a coherent way that achieves a task or an objective. Within this definition of a system, it must consist of three things: elements, interconnections, and functions. When a system is broken down in this manner, we can gain understanding of the relationships within the system to determine how it will function in the future with other

systems. To understand North Korea, it is possible to model it as a system within the international community to determine if policy actions are having the desired effect.

In 2014, the Special Representative for North Korea Policy from the U.S. Department of State provided testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in which he provided the basis for U.S. policy toward North Korea. The policy can be broken into eight main elements that are experiencing different levels of change (as indicated as increasing or decreasing and the rate of change).

Elements:

1. The amount of violations of obligations - increasing moderately
    a. Pursuit of nuclear weapons - increasing moderately
    b. Pursuit of ballistic missiles - increasing moderately
    c. Crimes against humanity - increasing moderately
2. The effectiveness of diplomacy - decreasing slowly
    a. Six Party Talks - decreasing rapidly
    b. Inter-Korean Relations - increasing slowly
    c. The role of China - increasing slowly
3. The North Korean level of isolation - increasing moderately
4. The amount of North Korean provocations - increasing moderately
5. The amount of sanctions - increasing slowly

6. The level of deterrence actions with allies - increasing moderately
7. The level of human rights violations - increasing slowly
8. The ability to protect U.S. Citizens - decreasing slowly

The Special Representative gave a good synopsis of what actions the U.S. takes to try and change North Korea's behavior. She states that North Korea can change its future if it simply changes its behavior, but she doesn't provide any compelling reasons for North Korea to do so beyond ending its isolation. She fails to realize that the North Korean regime continues to succeed if it remains isolated. The causal link diagram helps demonstrate the flaw in this logic. The causal link diagram in Figure 1 is a graphic depiction of how the United States and the International community react to North Korea's provocations and violations according to the speech from the Special Representative for North Korea Policy from the U.S. Department of State. Each oval in the diagram represents one of the elements that was introduced above, the relationship between the elements is depicted by the arrows between them. The diagram begins at the center when North Korea conducts an action. This leads to an increase (+) or decrease (-) in the associated element. The conclusion based on this tool is that all roads lead to isolation, the outcome element, of the North Korean regime, if the leverage element, diplomacy, is always decreased based on State Department policy.

Leverage Element

Diplomacy

Deterrence
Actions

−

−

+

Provocations
and
Violations

−

−

+

Protect U.S
Citizens

+

Isolation

+

+

Outcome Element

+

Level of Human
Rights
Violations

+

Sanctions

Figure 1.

Furthermore, the North Korean regime benefits from the isolation that they experience. Through isolation they can keep themselves in power through repression of the populace. Therefore, when they violate their obligations to the international community or create provocations, they actually achieve their objectives through the responses of the international community, to include the U.S. reaction. The U.S. national policy as described by the Department of State posits that when North Korea conducts provocations or violates international obligations, the U.S. must conduct deterrence actions and sanctions while limiting diplomacy. These actions further isolate

Pyongyang, and benefit the regime. To decrease the regime's isolation, steady or even increasing diplomacy is necessary while containing or mitigating the effects of North Korea's violations and provocations.

Effects of Global Trends

The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea does not exist in a vacuum. There are many regional and global factors to consider when determining future policy and strategy toward North Korea. To accomplish this, we identified several trends and endogenous (internal) variables embedded within the U.S. system that provide information through feedback loops. The top ten global trends affecting the U.S. policy toward North Korea are derived from the CJCS Joint Operating Environment 2035 document. We selected:

1. New poles of economic power - Some emerging economies in the developing world are gaining relative to Western economies, to include that of the Unites States, its traditional European partners, and Japan.
2. The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances - In Asia, perceptions of reduced U.S. commitment may encourage current allies and partners to pursue unilateral military modernization efforts or explore alternative alliances and partnerships.
3. The refinement of state hybrid stratagems - A number of revisionist

states will employ a range of coercive activities to advance their national interests through combinations of direct and indirect approaches designed to slow, misdirect, and blunt successful responses by targeted states.

4. The establishment of regional nuclear deterrents - The next two decades may feature competitors that pursue a rudimentary nuclear capability to establish a credible nuclear deterrent.

5. Emergence of alternative institutions of international order - The use of financial instruments of power by the West to disconnect revisionist states will increase their incentive to pursue alternative political and economic arrangements.

6. Continuing internal collapse of weak states - Some central governments will find it increasingly difficult to maintain power and control over their populations as groups object to mistreatment and neglect.

7. Uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction - It is likely that terrorist, insurgent or criminal groups will eventually obtain chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear weapons within the next two decades.

8. Demand for food or water exceeding local capacity to affordably deliver - Demand for supplies of food and water in the developing world will continue to increase.

9. Declining legitimacy of state authority - Under pressure from internal corruption or external stressors, state authorities in many parts of the world will be unwilling or unable to provide the level of support their citizens expect.

10. Open source design - Greater connectivity between states, groups, and individuals will facilitate more sharing of ideas and designs, which users can then modify, change, or otherwise improve to optimize them for their own purposes.

Endogenous or internal U.S. variables are:

1. Maintaining force readiness
2. Need to maintain a broad portfolio of capable forces
3. Need to maintain an industrial base
4. Need to invest in science and technology
5. Need to build on advancements in network warfare
6. Need to protect advanced technologies

Force Field Analysis

A force field analysis diagram can help develop an understanding of how the global trends introduced above can affect change as it relates to North Korea's actions. Force field analysis is a tool for decision makers to understand and analyze the forces or trends at play in the environment. Figure 2 is a diagram that attempts to show how these global trends either facilitate or help resist change as it relates to North Korean violations. The trends on the left side of the diagram help resist change or, in other words, help North Korea to continue violating

Figure 2.

international obligations. The trends on the right facilitate change. Each trend is also weighted according to their impact on the issue (authors' note: the weights are subjective and based upon the authors' understanding of the specific trend). The conclusion from this analysis is that the global trends identified will slightly help

North Korea resist change and in the end it will remain isolated.

Framing the Future

To frame how the future may look we used three distinct future wheels. The first futures wheel (Figure 3) explores the outcomes of the emergence of alternative institutions of international order and incorporates the possibility of the emergence of a new pole of economic power as a first order effect of the original trend. If you follow along this trend line, there are at least three potential outcomes: development of new global currency, a reduction in U.S. trade, or an increase in U.S. trade. Each of these futures have three different potential outcomes, and if you look at reduction in trade you see that the outcomes: increase in U.S. self-reliance; the U.S. is forced to innovate; and the U.S. economy is weakened.


Figure 3.

Figure 4.

The second futures wheel (Figure 4) explores the possibility of North Korea refining their use of state hybrid stratagems like weapons proliferation, use of cyber weapons and other information operations, and engaging adversaries through proxies. Following one

Figure 5.

possible future, we can look at North Korea developing more capable offensive cyber weapons which could lead to North Korea attacking the U.S. with cyber weapons which could have three possible future outcomes: no action by the U.S.; the U.S. counter-attacks; or the U.S. moves to increase sanctions on North Korea.

The third futures wheel (Figure 5) explores the possibility of North Korea collapsing from the inside. The future wheel explores

These futures wheels indicated that every global trend has several second- and third-order effects that will impact U.S. policy toward North Korea and some of the trends can quickly become very large issues with global implications. To demonstrate this reality, the third futures wheel was then further explored as an implication tree (Figure 6). Following the same example shown during the final futures wheel, at the center is the internal collapse of North Korea which is labeled as undesired from a U.S.


Figure 6.

the possibilities following such a collapse and one possible scenario is that North Korea could experience a civil war following the collapse. This civil war could lead to a long conflict with a lot of casualties, similar to what Syria is experiencing now. A potential future derived from this scenario is a failed state within North Korea.

perspective. After collapse, North Korea could experience a civil war, which is also undesired, with a 20% likelihood of occurrence. This civil war has a 20% likelihood of leading to a long conflict with a lot of casualties, which is also undesired. Given all of the preceding, it is 60% likely

that North Korea would become a failed state (Authors' note: the percentages are based upon the authors' estimate of the likelihood of each potential occurrence).

Next, a cross-impact analysis was conducted to gain more insight into future developments between the U.S. and North Korea. Each of the top ten global trends were analyzed to see how they impacted each other as it pertained to U.S. policy toward North Korea. For example, the trend New Poles of Economic Power was analyzed against all other trends. The emergence of new poles of economic power and the weakening of traditional U.S. alliances could lead to new forms of currency to compete against the U.S. dollar. Continuing along the top of the graph, the emergence of new poles of economic power and the refinement of state hybrid stratagems, especially in North Korea, means that there would be additional economic sectors that could be targeted by state hybrid stratagems.

The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances can be used as a good example of how this trend significantly affects all other trends in this cross-impact analysis. The impacts for each trend are shown below:

- New poles of economic power - Impact: Strengthens the need for new economic poles.
- The refinement of state hybrid stratagems - Impacts: Allies are more vulnerable to hybrid attack; which leads to the U.S. being more vulnerable to hybrid attack.

- The establishment of regional nuclear deterrents - Impacts: New nuclear umbrellas; new alliances.
- Emergence of alternative institutions of international order - Impact: Lack of U.S. leadership.
- Uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction - Impact: Nuclear/WMD attack on former allies.
- Demand for food or water exceeding local capacity to affordably deliver - Impact: Decrease in U.S. humanitarian aid.
- Declining legitimacy of state authority - Impacts: Rise of super-empowered corporations; Rise of super-empowered individuals.
- Open source design - Allies turn to open source design for weaponry to include WMD.

The continuing internal collapse of weak states is a realistic possibility for North Korea and another good example of how a trend significantly affects all other trends in this cross-impact analysis. Here are the impacts for each trend within that row:

- New poles of economic power - Impact: Collapsed states' economies put pressure on new poles of economic power.
- The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances - Impact: Weak states strain alliances further.
- The refinement of state hybrid stratagems - Impact: Collapsing states lash out using hybrid stratagems.

| Cross-Impact Trends	New poles of economic power	The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances	The refinement of state hybrid stratagems	The establishment of regional nuclear deterrents	Emergence of alternative institutions of international order	Continuing internal collapse of weak states	Uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction	Demand for food or water exceeding local capacity to affordably deliver	Declining legitimacy of state authority	Open source design
New poles of economic power	■	New global currency	Additional economies to impact	Alternative sources of income	Benefit to each other / Potential competition	New sanctions	Alternative income sources	rise or drop in food prices / rise or drop in water prices	State can diversify / Impact to state economy	New ways to pay for designs
The weakening of traditional U.S. alliances	Strengthen need for new economic poles	■	Allies are more vulnerable to hybrid attack / The U.S. is more vulnerable to hybrid attack	New nuclear umbrellas	Allies support alternative institutions / U.S. global power weakened	Lack of U.S. leadership	Nuclear attack on former allies	Decrease in U.S. humanitarian aid	Rise of corporations / Rise of individuals	Allies turn to open source design for weaponry
The refinement of state hybrid stratagems	Adversaries attack new poles through hybrid stratagems	Adversaries attack allies through hybrid stratagems	■	Regional nuclear powers use weapons to stop hybrid stratagems	Hybrid attacks against institutions	Weak states lash out using hybrid stratagems	Adversaries gain	States use food and water for control	States use hybrid stratagems to maintain authority	States gain weapons via open source design
The establishment of regional nuclear deterrents	Poles of economic power are built around nuclear power	Weakens alliances further	Regional nuclear powers deter hybrid stratagems	■	Nuclear deterrent used for international order	No impact	Widespread growth of nuclear states	States lose control of nuclear weapons	Nuclear weapons out of state control	Nuclear designs available on open source
Emergence of alternative institutions of international order	Institutions control economic poles	Alliances fail	New institutions put pressure on states using hybrid stratagems	New institutions put pressure on regional nuclear deterrents	■	New institutions can help stabilize collapsing states	New institutions can help control spread of WMD	New institutions can take responsibility of providing food and water	New institutions can provide order	New institutions can control open source designs
Continuing internal collapse of weak states	Collapsed states' economies put pressure on new poles of economic power	Weak states strain alliance further	Collapsing states lash out using hybrid stratagems	No real impact	Collapsing states place burden on new institutions	■	If collapsing states have WMD then they contribute to the spread of WMD	The collapsing of the state intensifies the crisis	The collapse of the state further weakens the state's authority	No real impact
Uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction	Places pressure on institutions to solve problem	Allies able to obtain WMD for own purposes / If adversaries obtain WMD, then allies develop own deterrent	States obtain WMD to use in hybrid stratagems	Regional deterrents feel pressure to use nuclear weapons	Places pressure on institutions to solve problem	Dissidents in collapsing states may obtain WMD / Collapsing states may use WMD against own people (Syria)	■	No real impact	Failing states may use WMD against own people (Syria)	WMD designs available on open source
Demand for food or water exceeding local capacity to affordably deliver	Places pressure on institutions to solve problem	Alliances are weakened further	Food and water become part of hybrid stratagems	Nuclear deterrents may have to divert resources from nuclear weapons to food and water	Places pressure on institutions to solve problem	Speeds up collapse of weak states	No real impact	■	Further declines legitimacy of the state	Open source designs on how to solve food and water problems (3D printing of food and water purification)
Declining legitimacy of state authority	Authority could shift to economic poles	Further weakens alliances	Non-state actors conduct hybrid stratagems	Authority could shift to regional deterrents	Authority could shift to international institutions	Speeds up collapse of weak states	Declining states' WMD fall into wrong hands	Declining states unable to provide food and water	■	States cannot control open source design
Open source design	Proliferation of economic devices	Allies able to obtain WMD for own purposes	Open source designs used as part of hybrid stratagems	Regional nuclear deterrents able to use open source designs	Open source design forces institutions to adapt	Collapsing states may use WMD against own people (Syria)	Open source design increases spread of WMD	Open source designs provide solutions to food and water crises	States attempt to use open source design to control state	■

Figure 7.

- The establishment of regional nuclear deterrents - No discernable impact.
- Emergence of alternative institutions of international order - Impact: Collapsing states place burden on new institutions.
- Uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction - Impact: If collapsing states have WMD then they contribute to the spread of WMD.
- Demand for food or water exceeding local capacity to affordably deliver - Impact: The collapsing of the state intensifies the crisis.

- Declining legitimacy of state authority - Impact: The collapse of the state further weakens the state's authority.
- Open source design - No discernable impact.

The cross-impact analysis (Figure 7) shows that as multiple trends become reality in North Korea and across the globe it will have second and third order impacts that will change the future and possibility for change in the North Korean system.

The illustration below (Figure 8) represents the two variables that we selected as the most

Figure 8.

uncertain: the weakening of traditional U.S. alliances and the continuing internal collapse of weak states, specifically North Korea. The upper right-hand quadrant represents a future in which North Korea collapses from internal strife, but U.S. alliances remain strong. This would lead to a period of pain for the Korean Peninsula, but would ultimately lead to reunification. The upper-left hand quadrant represents a future in which North Korea collapses but U.S. alliances are weakened. This would be an uncertain future as the influence in the area would be unknown, but it would potentially be under a new world order controlled by a different group or superpower, such as China or a Chinese alliance. The lower-left hand quadrant is similar, but North Korea would not collapse in this scenario. The lower-right hand quadrant represents a future where North Korea does not collapse, and U.S. alliances remain strong. This future most likely resembles the world today.

Social Change and Policy

Social change can be defined as the process of planned or unplanned qualitative or quantitative alterations in social phenomena that can be analyzed in terms of the interrelated components of: identity, level, duration, magnitude, and rate of change. Since societies themselves are multi-faceted with many variables, it would stand to reason that there are several theories of social change and that one or more of these theories can be applied to different societies to describe how social change takes place within that society.

Given the four future scenarios of New World Order, Reunification After a "Period of Pain", Who's in Charge, and Status Quo developed from the cross-impact analysis, we have identified six key stakeholders associated with U.S. policy towards North Korea: North Korea, U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Bishop and Hines espouse ten distinct theories of social change, or which six are applicable to the key stakeholders in U.S. policy towards North Korea. These theories are:

- **Progress Theory**: The key assumption of the Progress Theory is that today's societies are better than past societies, and future societies will be better than the present. It is the dominant explanation of social change in Western societies and postulates that even though most Westerners respect other cultures, they believe Western society is the best of all societies.

- **Technology Theory**: The Technology Theory assumes that the development and proliferation of technology is what drives social change. Just as change is inexorable, this theory suggests that the advancement of technology is inexorable as well. Additionally, it claims that technology is infinitely capable and as it continues to develop it will be able to support all societies at a high standard of living.

- **Culture Theory**: The Cultural Theory suggests that social change is based more on a society's history and culture than the material environment and that technology is part of that culture. The Culture Theory is a conservative theory through which change takes place slowly over a long period through socialization and exposure to other cultures.

- **Conflict Theory**: This theory assumes that change occurs because of the conflict among different groups and individuals in a society and that conflict exists even in a homogeneous society. However, it also states that being in conflict binds people and groups more closely together if there is no radical conflict that threatens the existence of the society.

- **Market Theory**: The Market Theory claims the production of goods and services is the most important mission of society and its economy and that capital investment is the best

mechanism for continued progress in the future. It also states that social change is driven by ingenuity and adaptation because of competition in the marketplace.

- **Power Theory**: The Power Theory advances the notion that human agency is the dominant source of social change and the best explanation of change is the story of individuals acting to create change. In this theory, it is individual people, or at most small groups of people who have the requisite social power to influence large groups and institutions to achieve certain goals and thereby create social change.

Social Change Theories Applied to Key Stakeholders in U.S. Policy Towards North Korea:

- North Korea: Culture Theory, Power Theory, Conflict Theory
- U.S.: Progress Theory, Market Theory, Technology Theory
- South Korea: Technology Theory, Culture Theory
- Japan: Technology Theory, Culture Theory
- China: Progress Theory, Power Theory, Culture Theory, Conflict Theory
- Russia: Progress Theory, Power Theory, Conflict Theory

One of the dominant social change theories for the U.S. is Progress Theory. One of its key assumptions is that today's societies are

better than past societies, and future societies will be better than the present. It also postulates that even though most Westerners respect other cultures, they believe Western society is the best of societies. As such, the U.S. judges other societies against Western society and its values. Therefore, the U.S. and other Western nations will continue to be in conflict with North Korea as they attempt to get North Korea to accept Western standards.

The social change theories of *Culture Theory, Power Theory, and Conflict Theory* form the basis of societal change in North Korea with the dominant social change theory being the Cultural Theory. The Cultural Theory suggests that social change is based more on a society's history and culture than the material environment, resulting in North Korea's primary behavioral driver being the preservation of their current societal structure. The center of gravity for North Korean society is the Kim family regime and its stability. Regime stability allows the elites in North Korean society to remain in power. Therefore, it is imperative that the history and culture of North Korea are emphasized over anything else to maintain the power base of the Kim regime and its elites. This is accomplished through propaganda and institutionalization of North Korean society writ large. Through application of the Culture Theory, North Korea's leadership can tightly manage any emerging societal change and ensure it is altered to support the Kim regime thereby ensuring regime stability. Because of this, North Korea will resist any attempts by the U.S. to force it into a different social paradigm. This resistance to change is one of the factors which drives North Korea's

isolationist tendencies, nuclear weapons development program, and provocative behavior.

Stress Testing Policies

To determine their validity, proposed policies must be subjected to tests. One such test is the stress test (Figure 9). The stress test is a projection of a given policy under a specific set of various circumstances and risks over time. The primary purpose of the stress test is to determine the legitimacy of our proposed U.S. policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea. Through the exploration conducted over the course of this project, we developed three recommendations for U.S. policy towards North Korea: 1) Continue the Current Policy of "Strategic Patience and Containment," 2) Direct Military Intervention, and 3) Involvement of China Through Diplomacy. During the stress test, we superimposed these policy recommendations across the four future scenarios of New World Order, Reunification After a "Period of Pain," Who's in Charge, and Status Quo developed in the Framing the Future analysis to determine which policy approach satisfies the scenario's security

Scenario-Policy Matrix	New World Order	Reunification After a Period of Pain	Who's In Charge	Status Quo
Current Policy of "Strategic Patience" and Containment	🔴	🟡	🟡	🟢
Direct Military Intervention	🔴	🟡	🔴	🔴
Involvement of China Through Diplomacy	🟡	🟢	🟡	🟢

🔴 Policy does not satisfy scenario security requirements

🟡 Policy partially satisfies scenario security requirements

🟢 Policy satisfies scenario security requirements

Figure 9.

requirements, partly satisfies the scenario's security requirements, or does not satisfy the scenario's security requirements.

The current U.S. policy towards North Korea of *Strategic Patience and Containment* has had limited success. Although it has prevented direct military conflict between the United States and North Korea, it has neither stopped the development of their technology, nor prevented conflict in the form of provocations and retaliation between North Korea and South Korea. The ultimate strategic end of this policy is murky as it is unlikely to force North Korea to give up on their current programs, but it could delay further development, and attempt to halt any proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to other states. Although the ends of this strategy are difficult to derive, the means of accomplishing this sliding end state are actionable and are currently being used by the United States and South Korea. In light of this analysis, we have postulated two additional policy options of *Direct Military Intervention* and *Involvement of China Through Diplomacy*.

The policy of the *Direct Military Intervention* recommendation is the destruction of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs through direct military action. The ways of this strictly military strategy are not limited to lethal weapons, but those would certainly be the most effective. Lethal means include air interdiction; ground assaults; and nuclear and/or conventional strikes against all nuclear and ballistic missile related facilities and equipment. Other ways available include offensive cyberspace operations, coercive sabotage operations, and other non-lethal operations. The destruction strategy is probably the most efficient method of directly dealing with the nuclear and ballistic missile threat from North Korea, and the most likely to achieve measurable and lasting results. However, this option is less likely to be acceptable by political leaders, the international community, and by any reasonable public. It may be acceptable to retaliate against North Korea in the event of an unprovoked attack with all options available, but it is less likely to be acceptable without provocation. Finally, North Korea is likely to respond militarily if any of their programs are attacked, which would also be unacceptable by international organizations.

The policy of the *Involvement of China Through Diplomacy* is for the U.S. to engage China directly through the means of back door diplomacy to encourage them to use their influence with North Korea to deter their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Although China claims that its influence with the current North Korean regime is not as strong as it has been in the past, they still have options through which they can impact North Korea. For example, China does not enforce UN economic sanctions against North Korea as strictly as they could. China remains North Korea's main export destination with 84% of all North Korean exports landing somewhere in China. The next closest North Korean export destination is India where they receive a mere 5% of North Korean exports. Therefore, there are levers that China can apply, if they desire, to coerce/compel North Korea to end their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Given the lack of success of the current policy, and the unlikely execution of the direct military intervention policy in the near future, we recommend a hybrid of continuation of the current policy of *Strategic Patience and Containment* to at least maintain the status quo, while placing renewed emphasis on *Involvement of China Through Diplomacy*. As previously stated, the current policy is limited in its effectiveness, but it does buy us time and decision space. In the decision space provided, we must continue to aggressively engage China to use their influence/diplomatic levers to open acceptable diplomatic channels with North Korea. Through application of this hybrid policy recommendation, we may be able to find a path towards resolution with North Korea.

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